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Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility: Evidence from Two Communities  
in Pakistan 
 
Mysbah Balagamwala and Haris Gazdar 
 
 
Summary 
  
This report contributes to the Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility project by examining the 
impact of food price volatility on poor and vulnerable households through qualitative research 
conducted in 2012 and 2013 at ‘listening posts’ in a rural and urban area of Pakistan. While 
food prices are high in relation to the purchasing power of the poor, price volatility has 
remained in check. This is partly due to policies for preventing shortages and price spirals 
which were put in place following the crisis period of 2007-09. Idiosyncratic shocks rather 
than price changes are conspicuous sources of food insecurity for poor households. Our 
study finds that the poor and vulnerable face short periods of hunger but prolonged hunger is 
prevented by informal mechanisms of support that operate through the ‘food economy’. 
While formal systems in the form of cash transfers and government employment are 
considered significant sources of support, the government is not considered as a guarantor 
of food security by the poor. We find that the ‘future farmers’ hypothesis does not hold true 
for Pakistan as increases in output prices have not changed attitudes of young people 
towards farming. 
 
Keywords: farmers; food price volatility; food security; food policy; hunger; informal social 
protection; Pakistan. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Main motivations and objectives 
Major shifts in food prices are significant events in people’s lives; in 2012 researchers at the 
Institute of Development Studies, Sussex (IDS) and Oxfam started a four-year project to 
track the impacts of this volatility. This project, Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility, aims to 
monitor and record how Food Price Volatility (FPV) changes everyday life because so many 
of the social costs of managing change are invisible to policy makers. Nutritional or poverty 
measures may indicate that people living in poverty have coped well and appear to be 
‘resilient’, but only because such measures often neglect the costs of this apparent 
resilience, including the increased time and effort required to feed and look after people; the 
non-monetary effects on family, social, or gender relations; mental health costs, such as 
stress; reductions in quality of life; and cultural issues, such as the pressure to eat ‘foreign’ 
fare, or food considered inferior. These issues tend to be neglected in nutrition and poverty 
impact studies, but they tend to matter a great deal to those affected (see Espey et al. 2010; 
Elson 2010; and Heltberg et al. 2012).  
 
Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility spans the period 2012-2015, and focuses on 
experiences from 10 urban/peri-urban and 13 rural locations, across 10 low- to middle-
income countries (see Table 1.1). It comprises a collective of researchers tracking, 
documenting, and analysing how FPV affects the everyday lives of people on low or 
precarious incomes, and focuses on paid work, the work of care or looking after families and 
others, how relationships are being affected, and what is happening to the resources people 
have with which to cope.  
 
The project has three component activities, namely:  
 
 Food security indicator tracking aimed at generating a picture of what has been 
happening to food security and food prices. 
 Qualitative research, with short annual visits to groups and households. Eight of the sites 
have been visited annually since 2009, and so 2012 was the fourth visit; in the remaining 
15 sites, research was initiated in 2012. 
 Integrated qualitative and quantitative (Q2) analyses of the impacts of food price changes 
on well-being, drawing on nationally representative poverty data for each country.  
 
Where this research is being conducted 
 
Ten countries were chosen, based on the following:  
 
 they have significant problems of undernourishment; 
 teams were already in situ, as in the case of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, and 
Zambia, where work with IDS on crisis monitoring research has been conducted since 
2009;  
 Oxfam offices in those countries asked to be involved to improve their understanding of 
FPV impacts.  
 
The 10 countries under study have been categorised according to their per-capita income 
levels and the prevalence of undernourishment (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1).1 
                                               
1  Income classifications follow those employed by the World Bank; undernourishment prevalence thresholds are 
subjectively set at 25 per cent of the population (above which undernourishment is adjudged to be severe), and 5 per 
cent (above which undernourishment is labelled moderate). Data sources: the World Bank, ‘GNI Per Capita, Atlas 
Method (Current US$)’, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (last accessed 18 March 2013); and 
FAO, ‘Food Security Indicators’, http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en (last accessed 18 March 2013). 
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Table 1.1 Country groupings 
 Low-income countries Lower-middle-income countries 
‘Severe’  
undernourishment 
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Kenya Guatemala and Zambia 
‘Moderate’ 
undernourishment 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Viet 
Nam  
Source: Hossain, King and Kelbert (2013) 
 
Figure 1.1 Research locations in the 10 developing countries  
 
Source: Hossain, King and Kelbert (2013). Reproduced by kind permission of Oxfam. 
 
1.2 Partnerships and organisations involved 
Oxfam and IDS have come together to coordinate this four-year project with BRAC 
Development Institute in Bangladesh, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social 
(CERES) in Bolivia, Institut des Sciences des Sociétés (INSS) in Burkina Faso, researchers 
from the University of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, researchers in Guatemala, Social Monitoring 
and Early Response Unit (SMERU) in Indonesia, Mpereeza Associates in Kenya, the 
Collective for Social Science Research in Pakistan (the Collective), VietSurvey and the 
Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD) in Viet Nam, 
researchers in Zambia, and a researcher from University College Cork in Ireland. Within 
each research location, the project also works with local officials, non-government 
organisations (NGOs), and community-based groups. The project is funded by the 
Government of the United Kingdom, and, for the first three years, by Irish Aid. Oxfam 
provided funds in the first year, and BRAC Development Institute supported the project by 
paying costs in one research site.  
 
This partnership grew out of earlier crisis-monitoring research by IDS with support from the 
British Government and Oxfam. It is in line with Oxfam’s GROW campaign on food justice. 
From 2013, more researchers are being commissioned to undertake integrated qualitative-
quantitative analyses of the effects of FPV on well-being at the national level. The project 
benefits from an advisory group to guide the research, analysis, communications, and uptake 
process. 
 
1.3 The Pakistan report 
In Pakistan, two rounds of qualitative fieldwork have been conducted in a rural site (villages 
in Dadu district) and an urban site (a low-income neighbourhood in Karachi, the largest city in 
the country). The first round of fieldwork was carried out in October 2012 and the same 
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communities were revisited in September-October 2013. This report is based on the findings 
of this qualitative research across the two years. The following section gives a brief overview 
of the national context of food security and food prices in Pakistan along with a discussion on 
food security-related policies and programmes that are in place. Section 3 introduces the 
methodology being used for the Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility project and how it has 
been adapted to Pakistan. The remaining sections discuss findings from our survey – 
Section 4 gives a brief description of research sites, their socio-economic features and 
livelihood options and shocks faced, Section 5 discusses the food economy, food 
consumption habits and food-related coping strategies while Section 6 recounts how inflation 
and price changes are perceived in the research site and provides a narrative of changes 
faced by households over the two rounds of survey. The next two sections address ‘special 
topics’ of research for Years 1 and 2 respectively – Section 7 ‘Future Farmers’ examines 
whether farming features in the livelihood aspiration of young people in our research sites 
and Section 8 titled ‘Local accountability for hunger’ is a discussion of how ‘right to food’ is 
viewed in our research sites and who people hold accountable for food insecurity and 
hunger. Section 9 concludes the paper with suggestions for policy and monitoring. 
2 National context of Food Price Volatility and 
policy responses 
2.1 Summary of national food security context 
2.1.1 Food security 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) food security indicators, there 
have been improvements in food security in Pakistan in the last 10 years (see Figure 2.1).2 In 
2001-03, a quarter of the population had inadequate calorie intake but this fell to 17 per cent 
in 2011-13.3 However, Average Dietary Energy Supply in Pakistan is over 100 per cent (and 
has been on an upward trend in the last 10 years) indicating that there is sufficient supply of 
food but a problem of distribution, due to which segments of the population are unable to 
meet energy requirements.4 While average calories consumed per adult equivalent in 
Pakistan are above the daily requirement of 2100 calories per day, about 38 per cent of 
households consumed less than 2100 calories per adult equivalent per day (Balagamwala 
and Gazdar 2013). FAO indicators are useful as they allow comparison over time. However, 
these indicators have been critiqued for not being able to capture short-term 
undernourishment and inequalities in consumption within the household; the same is true for 
calculations of calorie consumption from household data (de Schutter 2014). 
 
  
                                               
2  FAO Food Security Indicators, http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en (last accessed 3 April 2014). 
3  The Prevalence of Undernourishment expresses the probability that a randomly selected individual from the population 
consumes an amount of calories that is insufficient to cover her/his energy requirement for an active and healthy life. 
The indicator is computed by comparing a probability distribution of habitual daily Dietary Energy Consumption with a 
threshold level called the Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement. Both are based on the notion of an average individual 
in the reference population (see FAO, Food Security Indicators).   
4  Average Dietary Supply Adequacy is Dietary Energy Supply (DES) as a percentage of the Average Dietary Energy 
Requirement (ADER) in each country. Each country's or region's average supply of calories for food consumption is 
normalised by the average dietary energy requirement estimated for its population, to provide an index of adequacy of 
the food supply in terms of calories. Analysed together with the prevalence of undernourishment, it makes it possible to 
discern whether undernourishment is mainly due to insufficiency of the food supply or to particularly bad distribution. 
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Figure 2.1 Undernourishment and dietary energy supply adequacy in Pakistan 
 
Source: FAO Food Security Indicators (2013)  
 
The National Nutrition Survey of 2011 (NNS) is a nationally representative household survey 
and collects more detailed information on food consumption to determine household food 
security status (Aga Khan University 2011).5 It found that about two-fifths of households in 
Pakistan were food secure while 10 per cent experienced severe hunger and 20 per cent 
faced moderate hunger (see Table 2.1).6 A larger proportion of households in rural areas 
were found to be food insecure compared to urban areas (60 per cent and 48 per cent 
respectively). Among provinces there is a large variation – only 28 per cent of households in 
Sindh were termed food secure compared to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), where 69 per cent 
of households surveyed were found to be food secure. Sindh also has the highest proportion 
of households which faced severe hunger (17 per cent) whereas in Punjab and KP only 9 per 
cent and 5 per cent respectively were in a similar condition. Calculations from the Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey of 2007-08 also show households in Sindh have the lowest 
consumption of calories, whereas households in KP had the highest calorie consumption 
amongst all provinces (Balagamwala and Gazdar 2013). 
Table 2.1 Food security status in 2011 
  Pakistan 
(%) 
Urban 
(%) 
Rural 
(%) 
Food secure  42 47 39 
Food insecure without hunger  28.4 27 29 
Food insecure with moderate hunger  19.8 18 21 
Food insecure with severe hunger  9.8 8 11 
Source: National Nutrition Survey (Aga Khan University 2011) 
                                               
5  The FAO figures are based on quantities of food consumed converted into calories and calorie adequacy is measured 
against an international benchmark of energy requirements. The NNS figures on food insecurity and hunger, on the 
other hand use a definition of food security which is broader than energy requirements and include perceptions of 
hunger. The two statistics reflect different concerns and can therefore differ from one another. 
6  The NNS 2011 uses the FAO’s 2002 definition of food insecurity, i.e. ‘a situation that exists when all people, at all times, 
have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life’. It classified households into four categories of food security – food secure 
(households that show no evidence of food insecurity), food insecure but without hunger (there is no or little reduction in 
food intake but there are compromises on quality), food insecure with moderate hunger (only adults go hungry while 
children are not hungry) and food insecure with severe hunger (all members of the household including children have 
experienced hunger).   
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2.1.2 Dietary diversity 
Haq and Suleri (2009) measured diversity of diet through food consumption scores7 which 
they calculated for households surveyed across the country. Households were divided into 
three groups according to their food consumption scores– acceptable, borderline and poor – 
and it was found that most of the population was in the borderline category while 16 per cent 
of households had a poor diet (see Table 2.2). The report found that most households 
consumed cereals, sugar and oil every day, yet consumption of nutrient-rich foods such as 
meat and fruits was infrequent. The NNS 2011 collected detailed information of foods 
consumed by non-pregnant mothers of reproductive age through a 24-hour recall survey and 
calculated a breakdown of energy and nutrient intake of food consumption. According to the 
survey, on average women in Pakistan are energy deficient as their daily calorie intake is 
1479 calories compared to a recommended allowance of 2100,8 and while there is adequate 
intake of iron and macronutrients such as proteins, fats and carbohydrates, intake of 
micronutrients (calcium, phosphorous, zinc and vitamin C) falls short of the recommended 
allowance (Aga Khan University 2011; Pakistan National Nutrition Survey 2011).  
 
Table 2.2 Classification of households according to food consumption score 
Food Consumption Group % of population 
Poor 16 
Borderline 58 
Acceptable 26 
Source: Haq and Suleri (2009). 
 
2.1.3 Household expenditure and consumption 
To see whether household expenditure on food and consumption have changed in the last 
five years, we use data from the last three rounds of the Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (HIES) - a national sample survey conducted every few years.9 Since our research 
sites are located in the province of Sindh, along with national level statistics we report data 
for urban Sindh and rural Sindh. Households in Pakistan spend a large part of their monthly 
expenditure on food and the share of expenditure on food is higher for poorer households. A 
comparison over the three rounds shows that there was an increase in the proportion of 
expenditure on food between 2007-08 and 2010-11, which could be an impact of high rates 
of food inflation during this period, but a decline was observed between 2010-11 and 2011-
12. However, the percentage of total expenditure that households spent on food in 2011-12 
(the latest round of the HIES) remained above 2007-08 levels. Households in rural Sindh 
spend a larger part of their expenditure on food compared to households in urban Sindh (56 
per cent compared to 40 per cent) but the gap is comparatively smaller for the poorest 
households in the sample (60 per cent compared to 54 per cent) (see Table 2.3). 
 
  
                                               
7  Food consumption scores are calculated on the basis of frequency of consumption of a food group in a week. The 
number of days each food group is consumed is multiplied with a weight given to each food group according to its 
nutrient content.  
8  The NNS 2011 shows that on average women are consuming about 1500 calories in a day while calculations from HIES 
2007-08 show that per capita daily consumption of calories is 2400. The large gap could reflect intra-household 
differences in consumption as women may be consuming less than men and children in the household. Difference in 
methodologies of the two surveys could also explain the difference – the NNS collects more detailed information using a 
24-hour recall for one individual whereas the HIES collects information on what a household has consumed in the last 
14 days for some items and last one month for other food items.  
9  HIES 2007-08, HIES 2010-11 and HIES 2011-12. These surveys have been conducted by the Pakistan Bureau of 
Statistics.  
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Table 2.3 Proportion of household expenditure on food  
 2007-08 
(%) 
2010-11 
(%) 
2011-12 
(%) 
Pakistan (All) 44 49 45 
Sindh Urban (All) 37 41 40 
Sindh Rural (All) 53 60 56 
Pakistan (Poorest) 55 59 56 
Sindh Urban (Poorest) 52 58 54 
Sindh Rural (Poorest) 58 63 60 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIES 2007-08 (FBS, 2009), HIES 2010-11 and 2011-12 (PSB 2011, 2013a) 
 
Within expenditure on food, a quarter of expenditure of the poorest households goes on 
cereals such as wheat and rice followed by milk and edible oils and fats. The top 20 per cent 
of households, however, spend only 13 per cent of their food expenditure on cereals. Meat, 
fish and poultry contribute only 6 per cent of food expenditure for the poorest households, 
compared to 15 per cent for households in the top quintile (PBS 2013a).  
 
There were no drastic changes in composition of food expenditure between the survey 
rounds. There was a fall in the expenditure share of fruits, milk products and edible oils and 
fats between 2007-08 and 2010-11 while there was an increase in the expenditure share of 
sugar and potatoes, tomatoes and onions. Comparison of expenditure on cereals over 
survey rounds shows that there was a small decline in the expenditure share of cereals 
between 2007-08 and 2010-11 and a decline of 1 percentage point between 2010-11 and 
2011-12 (Table 2.4). However, a look at quantities consumed shows that there was an 
increase in the consumption of rice and wheat between 2007-08 and 2010-11 but a decline 
in 2011-12 (Table 2.5). There has been a decline in the consumption of milk as well but an 
increase in the consumption of edible oil and vegetable ghee (hydrogenated vegetable fat) 
and fruits (Table 2.5), items on which proportional expenditure had fallen (Table 2.4). Along 
with an increase in proportional expenditure, consumption of potatoes and tomatoes also 
increased but the consumption of onions declined even though there was an increase in its 
expenditure. 
 
Table 2.4 Proportion of food expenditure on different food groups 
  2007-08 
(%) 
2010-11 
(%) 
2011-12 
(%) 
Cereals 19.5 19.2 18.2 
Pulses 2.4 2.6 2.3 
Milk Products 25.1 23.9 25.2 
Meat, fish and poultry 10.3 10.0 11.3 
Edible Oils and fats 11.6 10.1 10.8 
Fruits 3.8 3.5 3.1 
Potatoes, Tomatoes, Onions 4.7 5.3 4.1 
Other vegetables 3.3 3.3 3.5 
Sugar and gur 5.1 7.5 5.4 
Tea 2.0 2.1 2.4 
Other 12.3 12.5 13.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIES 2007-08 (FBS, 2009), HIES 2010-11 and 2011-12 (PSB 2011, 2013a) 
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Table 2.5 Monthly per capita consumption of selected food items  
 2007-08 2010-11 2011-12 
Wheat (kg) 7.75 7.98 7.67 
Rice (kg)    0.89 1 0.97 
Milk (litres)  6.83 6.53 6.36 
Vegetable Ghee (kg)        0.68 0.74 0.74 
Cooking oil (litres)     0.16 0.17 0.2 
Chicken meat (kg) 0.25 0.26 0.29 
Banana (units) 3 3.78 3.11 
Other fruits (kg) 0.9 2.03 2.12 
Potatoes (kg)            0.99 1.1 1.19 
Tomatoes (kg)            0.32 0.38 0.38 
Onions (kg)            0.91 0.83 0.93 
Sugar (kg)  1.32 1.31 1.28 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIES 2007-08 (FBS, 2009), HIES 2010-11 and 2011-12 (PSB 2011, 2013a) 
 
We calculate the ratio of consumption of households in the top quintile to consumption of 
households in the bottom quintile to see differences in consumption of the rich and poor. 
Table 2.6 shows that there is not much difference in the consumption of cereals (wheat and 
rice), vegetable ghee, potatoes and sugar, but more expensive (and nutrient-dense) items 
such as chicken, eggs, and fruits have a very high ratio (e.g. in 2011-12 richest households 
consumed more than five times the chicken and eggs consumed by the poorest households). 
Across survey rounds, there is no definable trend in change in ratios across food 
commodities. For instance, the gap in consumption of fruits and eggs between the top and 
bottom households reduced over the three survey periods but the calculated ratio increased 
for milk, chicken and cooking oil between 2007-08 and 2010-11 and fell in 2011-12.  
 
Table 2.6 Ratio of consumption of households in top quintile to households in 
poorest quintile, by food items 
 2007-08  2010-11 2011-12 
Wheat and wheat flour    1.11 1.21 1.18 
Rice and rice flour    1.64 1.59 1.81 
Pulses 2.06 2.16 2.05 
Milk (Fresh & boiled)    2.98 3.21 2.86 
Butter, Margarine & cream  7.69 18.06 23.34 
Vegetable Ghee        1.14 1.23 1.11 
Cooking oil         14.67 10.50 16.67 
Chicken meat         5.67 6.00 5.45 
Eggs 6.03 5.76 5.46 
Other fruits 8.50 6.46 4.32 
Potatoes        1.58 1.48 1.46 
Other vegetables 2.09 1.97 1.94 
Sugar 1.60 1.65 1.53 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HIES 2007-08 (FBS, 2009), HIES 2010-11 and 2011-12 (PSB 2011, 2013a) 
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2.2 Recent movements in national food prices  
The rate of inflation (both general and food Consumer Price Index (CPI)) was on a downward 
trend between December 2010 and May 2013. Year-on-year inflation in December 2010 was 
15.5 per cent but by May 2013 had fallen to 5.1 per cent, the lowest since April 2004. 
Between November 2011 and April 2013 food price inflation remained lower than general 
inflation, in contrast to the first half of 2011 when food inflation greatly surpassed general 
inflation (Figure 2.2). A longer trend in the CPI, as seen in Figure 2.3, shows that inflation 
increased substantially in the second half of the 2000s, peaking at a period average of 20 per 
cent in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. While inflation remains high, it has decreased considerably 
since then and is no longer in double digits. In the same period, economic growth has been 
sluggish, but has picked up pace since 2008-09.  
Figure 2.2 Change in price indices between December 2010 and November 2013 
 
Source: Compiled from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2013c) 
Figure 2.3 Inflation and Economic Growth, FY 1995 to FY 2013 
 
Source: GDP data from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2013b), inflation data from Economic Survey of Pakistan 2012-13 and 
State Bank of Pakistan Monthly Statistical Bulletin December 2013. 
 
In 2012 and 2013 prices of most food commodities remained stable without much fluctuation 
over time, except for the prices of poultry which generally tend to fluctuate across the year 
(see Figure 2.4). There was a sharp rise in the price of cooking oil especially between March 
and June 2012 as prices increased by 25 per cent over these three months. However, 
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between the two rounds of fieldwork, there was a decline of about 2 per cent in the price of 
edible oil (Table 2.7). The price of wheat increased more between the two rounds of 
fieldwork as compared to the year preceding the first round of fieldwork whereas the change 
in price of the rice, the other commonly eaten cereal, was same for both time periods. The 
price of milk, however, grew more between November 2011 and 2012 compared to 2012 and 
2013 (and in our fieldwork too urban informants complained about milk prices in Year 1 but 
not in Year 2). Household consumption and expenditure data, discussed earlier, reflects this 
as well as it shows that milk consumption declined between 2010-11 and 2011-12 but share 
of expenditure on milk products increased (see Table 2.4 and Table 2.5). Gram pulses 
(commonly eaten in our research sites) experienced a substantial price increase in the year 
preceding round one but prices had considerably fallen in Year 2 (Table 2.7). There has 
been a noticeable increase in the prices of potatoes (which poor households consume in 
large quantities) in the last few months of 2013 – in June 2013 the prices of potatoes per 
kilogram were Rs.25 (US$0.25) which more than doubled to Rs.60 (US$0.55) in November 
2013. However, the prices of potatoes have since reduced (the price in January 2014 was 
Rs.28.87/kg (US$0.27). This increase in price has been attributed to delay in harvesting of 
the potato crop in Punjab which was a result of changes in climate patterns. However, some 
attribute it to price and trade policies of the government (Rizvi 2013). 
 
Figure 2.4 Movements in retail prices of selected commodities between January 2012 
and November 2013 
 
 
 
Source: Monthly Review of Prices, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2013c) 
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Table 2.7 Percentage change in prices of selected food items  
 Nov 11- Nov 12 
(%) 
Nov 12- Nov 13 
(%) 
Wheat Flour 12.09 24.29 
Rice  8.81 8.74 
Chicken 1.86 4.29 
Milk 13.52 6.11 
Vegetable Ghee, Tin 5.42 -2.13 
Pulses Mash -9.16 -2.15 
Pulses Gram 45.32 -31.57 
Potatoes 7.54 95.43 
Sugar -17.07 8.86 
Tea 6.65 20.66 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Monthly Review of Prices, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (for 2012 and 2013 data) and 
State Bank of Pakistan Inflation Monitor (for November 2011 data) 
 
With regards to fuel prices in the months leading to the two qualitative survey rounds, there 
were increases in petrol prices by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Board (OGRA) in August 2012 
(10 per cent), and September 2012 (6.7 per cent), and the prices of Compressed Natural 
Gas (CNG) were brought to par with oil prices, increasing by 20 per cent in September 2012. 
However, this was overturned in October 2012 (after our fieldwork took place) by a directive 
of the Supreme Court and CNG prices were reduced by about 35 per cent. In August 2013 
and September 2013 too petrol prices were increased by 3 per cent and 8 per cent 
respectively, however, there were no changes in the price of CNG. 10 
2.3 Evidence of poverty and food security impacts over past year 
Official data on the headcount rate of poverty in Pakistan have not been available since 
2008, and unofficial estimates based on household budget data (from HIES) suggest that 
poverty continued to decline throughout this period (Newman 2013). In fact, Pakistan, like 
many other countries faced a dramatic economic slowdown as well as price volatility in 2007-
2009, leading to the widespread expectation that poverty ratios would have risen. When the 
results of survey data showed continuing downwards poverty trends, questions were raised 
about the credibility of the survey data and poverty estimation methods, leading the 
government to disown the numbers (ibid.) Information on daily wage rates of labour is 
available (see Table 2.8) and shows that while rates of change in wages of unskilled workers 
and prices varied across years, in 2014 real wages were around 95 per cent of their 2009 
value. Within this period, in the years relating to our study (2012 and 2013) wages rose faster 
than prices.  
 
Table 2.8 Percentage change in wages and food prices 
 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 
(Jul-Oct) 
Daily wage (Unskilled Labour) 16.7 7.1 0.0 20.0 11.1 6.2 
Inflation (Changes in CPI) 17.0 10.1 13.7 11.0 7.4 8.3 
Real wages (Unskilled labour) 299.07 291.04 256.06 276.80 286.48 285.76 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Economic Survey of Pakistan 2012-13, State Bank of Pakistan Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin December 2013 and Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2013d                 
                                               
10  World Food Programme Pakistan, Pakistan Market Price Bulletin – September 2012, October 2012, September 2013 
and October 2013 issues. 
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2.4 National policy developments  
In analysing food-security related policies in Pakistan we follow Gazdar and Mallah (2010) in 
dividing them into supply-side measures and market intervention, consumer subsidies and 
income support. The food price volatility crisis of 2007-2009 was an important turning point in 
policy-making in the country. The period coincided with a change of government and the 
resulted in the setting up of a National Food Security Task Force in 2008 which was asked to 
recommend policy reform. The two main recommendations of this task force were related, 
respectively, to stabilisation wheat prices in line with world prices, and establishing a cash 
transfer system for social protection (Balagamwala and Gazdar 2013). 
2.4.1 Supply-side measures and market interventions 
Wheat procurement policy  
The main supply-side policy in Pakistan is the wheat procurement policy of the government. 
The government announces a support price of wheat at which it purchases wheat from 
farmers during harvest season and this price, to a certain extent, determines the market price 
of wheat. In the past wheat support prices were kept depressed below world prices to ensure 
low prices of staple grain for urban consumers, but this was changed following 
recommendations of the National Food Security Task Force in 2008. The Task Force gave a 
basis for formulation of wheat pricing policy by providing evidence that wheat output 
responds to prices, and that local prices were not shielded from global prices as wheat is 
exported (often illegally) to neighbouring countries at international prices. It was found that 
the failure to raise the wheat procurement price in line with emerging global trends in 2007 
had exacerbated price volatility in Pakistan, led to hoarding, shortages, and price spirals 
which were then broken with the use of expensive wheat imports. The wheat support price 
which was Rs 625 (US$ 10)/maund [40 kilograms] in 2007-08 was increased to Rs.950 
(US$12) in the following year. This was one of the most significant changes in agricultural 
policy in Pakistan and it helped improve agricultural growth rates and allowed prices of wheat 
to remain stable in the domestic market even when international prices were fluctuating 
(Balagamwala and Gazdar 2013; Prikhodko and Zrilyi 2013). 
 
Wheat procured by the government is transported by the private sector and the government 
provides financing to ensure wheat is transported to deficit areas. The government sets a 
release price at which it sells the wheat to millers and regulates the price at which wheat flour 
is to be sold. The government purchases about 30 per cent of wheat produced while 30 per 
cent is stored by producers for own consumption.  
 
Changes in wheat policy  
Wheat is procured by the federal government through the Pakistan Agriculture Storage and 
Supply Corporation (PASSCO) and by provincial governments through their respective food 
department. Procurement price used to be set by the federal government at the beginning of 
the marketing year of wheat (May) and followed across provinces. But constitutional changes 
in Pakistan in 2010 under the 18th Amendment devolved food procurement policymaking to 
provincial governments. So far, provincial government had kept the same procurement prices 
as those set by the federal government.11 However, this year (2014) Sindh has increased 
procurement price to Rs.1,250/maund (US$11.90) whereas the federal government’s price 
remains unchanged at Rs.1,200/maund (US$11.40).12 The wheat procurement price was 
changed by the Sindh government right before harvest season (and not before the start of 
the wheat sowing season as has been done before). KP and Balochistan provinces followed 
Sindh, and in fact the Balochistan government changed prices in the middle of procurement 
                                               
11  The Ministry for National Food Security and Research is responsible for setting wheat procurement prices at the federal 
level. 
12  Siddiqui (2014) http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-243844-Sindh-increases-wheat-support-price [accessed 12 
May 2014]. 
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to ensure that wheat from Balochistan was not smuggled to Sindh.13 The implications of 
these changes for prices and availability of wheat may become apparent in the next year. 
 
Price watch and market interventions 
The Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) of the Cabinet is the ‘watchdog for prices and 
inflation’. It meets every two weeks to coordinate fiscal, monetary and trade policies of the 
government (Tahir 2005). The Committee reviews price data collected by the Pakistan 
Bureau of Statistics14 and takes necessary steps (such as changing trade policies or wheat 
support price) if prices need to be brought down. The government through the Trading 
Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) intervenes in the market through regulation of domestic and 
international trade to ensure availability of essential commodities in the market and to control 
prices faced by the consumer e.g. banning the export of vegetables to bring down prices in 
the local market15 or disallowing private imports of wheat into the country (Prikhodko and 
Zrilyi 2013).  
 
Monitoring systems at the local level16 
At the local level, food security is ensured through improving access to food by keeping a 
control on prices. Following high food prices in 2008, the Sindh government revived the 
defunct Bureau of Supply and Prices which was later converted to a department within the 
provincial government. The department is responsible for control of prices and distribution of 
civil supplies and essential commodities and matters connected with profiteering and 
hoarding and follows the laws laid out by the Sindh Essential Commodities Price Control and 
Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act of 2008 (referred to as Sindh Price Control Act 
from this point onwards).17 
 
The Sindh Price Control Act provides a list of items or ‘essential commodities’18 of which 
prices and stocks are to be controlled, regulated and monitored by the government, and lays 
out the sanctions for persons who do not follow orders given under this act. It empowers the 
government to appoint a Price Controller at the district level to check prices and stocks of 
essential commodities and to ask any producer or supplier for information regarding 
production, distribution, prices and sale of essential commodities. This act also makes it 
compulsory for retailers (including push cart vendors) to display a price list of these essential 
commodities.19 There are currently no consumer protection laws in Sindh (the only province 
in the country where these laws and consumer courts do not exist).The Sindh Consumer 
Protection Ordinance of 2007 failed to convert to an act and has lapsed.20  
 
The Supply and Prices Department’s function is to monitor wholesale markets and auctions 
of commodities such as fruits and vegetables (locally known as mandi) to survey stocks of 
commodities and prices determined by the market. The controlling authority is at the sub-
                                               
13  http://www.dawn.com/news/1107485/balochistan-increases-wheat-support-price-by-rs50 [accessed 20 May 2014]. 
14  The Pakistan Bureau of Statistics collects price data from a number of urban areas in the country. Data to calculate the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is collected and reported on a monthly basis while data to compute the Sensitive Price 
Index (SPI) is collected from major cities on a weekly basis (see Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, ‘Methodology of Price 
Collection and Computing Price Indices’). 
15  http://www.dawn.com/news/1056015 [accessed 12 May 2014]. 
16  This section is based on interviews conducted with representatives of the Bureau of Supply and Price, Government of 
Sindh, Consumer Rights Council Sindh, Karachi Wholesale Grocers Association, Fruit and Vegetable Market 
Association and various retailers.  
17  Government of Sindh, Supply and Prices Department, http://www.sindh.gov.pk/dpt/S&PD/index.htm, [Accessed 13 May 
2014]. 
18  This list includes the following food items: fresh milk, powdered milk, beef, mutton, chicken meat, milk for infants, white 
sugar, tea, edible oils and vegetable ghee, aerated water, fruit juices and squashes, vegetables, fruits, fish, eggs, 
pulses, wheat flour, rice, red chillies, spices and bakery items.  
19  Provincial Assembly of Sindh, ‘The Sindh Essential Commodities Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and 
Hoarding Act, 2005’. 
20  Maker (2014)  http://www.nation.com.pk/national/16-Feb-2014/the-elusive-consumer-protection-ordinance [accessed 15 
May 2014] 
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provincial level. In Karachi, the Commissioner of Karachi21 is Controller General Prices and 
he supervises the Karachi Division Price Committee which is responsible for setting prices of 
‘essential commodities’, inspecting markets and sanctioning those who contravene the laws 
set out by the Sindh Price Control Act.22 This committee comprises of government officials 
along with representatives of various business associations (e.g. Grocers Association of 
Pakistan) and consumer councils (e.g. Consumers’ Right Protection Council). This 
committee sets a price list for essential consumer items on a regular basis, with frequency 
depending on the food item: prices of fruits and vegetables are set daily while prices of 
grocery items are revised once every two weeks). In these meetings, representatives of 
business associations prepare a list of prices of food items according to demand and supply 
in domestic and international markets. However, a representative of one such association felt 
that the Price Committee does not take these into account but set prices according to their 
own will. The Bureau of Supply and Prices also presents a price list based on their 
observations of wholesale markets and auctions. The Consumer Rights Council is an 
autonomous body that was set up by the provincial government in 2005 with a mandate to 
protect consumer rights. Their role is to monitor prices and give suggestions to the price 
committees so that consumers are not unfairly charged. 
 
Price Inspectors are field officers of the Controller who monitor prices in the market and fine 
retailers that violate price lists and other price laws such as the requirement to display a price 
list at retail points. Penalties are as per the Price Control Act and depend on the violation. 
They can go up to Rs.30,000 (approximately US$300) and up to 6 months of imprisonment 
(Provincial Assembly of Sindh 2008). There are supposed to be complaint centres in each 
market, but consumers do not usually record their complaints.  
 
The rationale behind the price control system is not directly linked to ensuring food security 
for consumers but to curtail earning of excess profits by retailers and to prevent artificial 
changes in prices due to hoarding. Prices are regulated rather than determined as wholesale 
prices are determined at auctions and through demand and supply fluctuations. The Grocers’ 
Association that takes part in the Price Committee meetings calculates prices taking into 
account demand for products and supply lines. Similarly, auctions are held which determine 
prices of items like fruits, vegetables and poultry and according to the prices of these 
auctions retail prices are set. While there are frequent raids on retailers in which fines are 
imposed,23 the effectiveness of price regulation cannot be judged. A member of the Fruit and 
Vegetable Market Association labelled the price list set by the government as a ‘dummy list’ 
because it does not reflect actual retail prices as these lists are calculated on the basis of 
average prices, without taking into consideration factors such as quality, and because market 
factors determine actual retail prices.  
2.4.2 Consumer subsidies  
Subsidies are given to consumers of wheat by providing millers with subsidised wheat so that 
wheat flour is sold at low prices. The government also runs Utility Stores which sell essential 
commodities at a cheaper rate than market price. The Utility Stores also provide special 
packages in Ramzan (the Muslim month of fasting) when a basket of food commodities is 
sold at a discounted price. Such measures are taken to protect consumers from high prices 
during Ramzan which are a result of increased demand during the month.  
 
                                               
21  In administrative terms Karachi Division consists of 5 districts. The government machinery in each district is headed by 
a Deputy Commissioner, who reports to the Commissioner who heads the division. 
22  Website of Commissioner of Karachi (http://commissionerkarachi.gos.pk/) accessed 12 May 2014. The website has 
price lists of essential commodities which are updated on a regular basis. 
23  Business Recorder (2014) http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/markets/126112-2305-price-hiker  and 
http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/markets/172681-100-shopkeepers-fined-for-profiteering.html [accessed 16 May 
2014]. 
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In Punjab, a ‘sasti roti’ (literally translated as cheap bread) programme was promulgated in 
2008 to provide subsidised wheat flour to tandoors (ovens) from which urban consumers 
purchase roti (flat bread) such that the price of a roti was half of the market price of roti of a 
similar type. Targeting was done geographically such that tandoors in low-income 
neighbourhoods were licensed to be part of the programme, but the subsidy was largely 
untargeted. The programme had a budget of Rs.3.3 billion (approximately US$42 million) in 
2008-09 (Gazdar 2011). However, this programme was discontinued in 2009-10. 
2.4.3 Income support  
The main social safety net programme of the government of Pakistan is the Benazir Income 
Support Programme (BISP) which was established in 2008 with the rationale of protecting 
the poorest fifth of the population against high rates of food price inflation that had been 
experienced in preceding years. The National Task Force on Food Security, which had 
recommended tackling some of the effects of food price volatility (such as shortages and 
price spirals) through changes in wheat procurement policy, had also recommended 
compensating the poor through a targeted cash transfer programme. The BISP represented 
a ‘paradigm shift’ in social protection provision in Pakistan as it went beyond existing 
programmes of the government such as the Bait-ul-Maal in terms of fiscal allocation, size 
and targeting (Gazdar 2011). The BISP is an unconditional cash transfer given to women in 
households selected through a proxy means test in the form of a Poverty Scorecard Census. 
Beneficiaries of the programme were initially given Rs.1,000 per month or Rs.3,000 
(approximately US$30) every three months. In 2013 the amount was increased by 20 per 
cent and an instalment of Rs.3,600 (approximately US$36) is now paid every quarter. Seven 
million women in Pakistan are eligible for the BISP cash transfer, of which over 5 million were 
active beneficiaries in 2013.24 An impact evaluation of the programmes shows that more than 
four-fifth of beneficiaries of the programme reported spending the cash received through 
BISP on food (OPM 2014).  
2.4.4 Other policy developments 
In 2010, a major raft of constitutional amendments (popularly known as the 18th Amendment) 
devolved responsibilities on a range of subjects from the federal to the provincial level of 
government. The federal ministry of agriculture and livestock was abolished as most of its 
functions had been passed down to the provinces. A new Ministry of National Food Security 
and Research (MNSFR) was created with a mandate to ensure food security at the national 
level and to coordinate and plan agricultural strategy. The Ministry is responsible for 
developing a National Food Security strategy, and while it has been three years since the 
ministry has been formed this policy is yet to be approved, and remains in the draft stage.  
 
The first draft of this policy was titled ‘National Food Security and Nutrition Security Policy’ 
and its main objective was to reduce food insecurity by 50 per cent by 2030 and to 0 per cent 
by 2050 (MNFSR 2013b). It was modelled after the Zero Hunger programme of Brazil and 
stated that the “parliament should enact a food security legislation to make ’right to food’ a 
fundamental right” and called for the formation of a Food and Nutrition Security Council (an 
inter-ministerial body which involved the civil society responsible for coordinating all actions 
and programmes related to food and nutrition security) and of a Food and Nutrition Security 
Information System which could monitor and evaluate all food and nutrition security related 
programmes. Under the Pakistan Zero Hunger Action Plan it proposed interventions such as 
school feeding programmes, nutrition programmes, condition cash or food transfers and 
support during disasters and agricultural programmes such as those that provide support for 
small farmers, rationalisation of market prices of food, supply and distribution programmes 
for poor and improvement of water supply. The strategy could have possibly faced many 
                                               
24  The remaining 2 million while eligible do not receive the cash transfer as they do not have a Computerised National 
Identity Card (CNIC) which is a requirement to receive the cash transfer or due to other discrepancies in information 
collected about beneficiaries such as postal address etc.  
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challenges such as coordination between sectors and coordination between federal and 
provincial actors. There was also considerable overlap with the goals of multi-sectoral 
nutrition strategies which has been developed by all provinces and it was not clear how the 
two strategies would interact.  
 
In the event, the draft was replaced by an ‘Agriculture and Food Security Policy’ which shifts 
its attention away from nutrition and focuses on strengthening the role of agriculture in 
ensuring food security (MNFSR 2013a). It recognises a range of challenges that face the 
agricultural sector in the coming years and sets out a vision and goal for agriculture and food 
security along with guiding principles for both the provinces and the federal government. The 
central focus of the policy is to achieve sustainable growth in the productivity of major crops 
while promoting high value agriculture such as horticulture, fisheries and livestock and 
highlights the need to accelerate technological innovation and research efforts backed by 
institutional reform and investment. A set of actions is also proposed for better management 
of land and water and a reform of trade and fiscal measures. The policy clearly sets out to 
target marginalised and food insecure groups including women and children and the 
importance of maintaining strategic reserves and subsidies for these groups. For 
implementation, it requires the involvement of various ministries, departments and institutions 
at a federal level while giving operational responsibility for actions to the provinces. This 
policy focuses on production and aggregate food availability, but falls short on how access to 
food will be ensured. It proposes provision of food vouchers to vulnerable groups along the 
lines of the Benazir Income Support Programme (targeted to women in poor households) 
and the Brazilian Fome Zero food security programme, but provides no operational details. 
Inter-sectoral nutrition strategies that have been developed by Sindh (and other provincial 
governments) include similar ideas e.g. provision of food through the BISP system along with 
provision of vouchers in for subsidised food items in school to families of school children 
(Government of Sindh 2013). The policy also includes a nutritional education component for 
women with a focus on improving food habits and promoting healthy infant and young child 
feeding practices through mass media information campaigns and strengthening of the 
nutrition curriculum in educations institutions. However, no details are provided on how this 
will be linked with existing nutrition programmes which have more advanced nutrition 
education proposals than the actions recommended by the food security policy.  
2.5 Discussion 
Our analysis above shows that in Pakistan rate of inflation and volatility in prices have come 
down from the high levels experienced in 2007-09. The movements in overall prices and 
prices of essential food commodities in the crisis period of 2007-09 which have been 
analysed in Gazdar and Mallah (2010) were a result of volatile world market prices, a 
domestic business-cycle effect – the 2008-09 inflation spike occurred after a period of high 
economic growth in Pakistan – and domestic price management. The latter is especially 
important in the context of Pakistan because policies that existed at that time created a large 
differential between the international and domestic price of the staple commodity, wheat, 
leading to price speculation and hoarding which not only drove up prices but also created 
large fluctuations in prices from one month to another. Due to shortages in the market, the 
government had to intervene by importing wheat at a higher price, by providing untargeted 
consumer price subsidies and by preventing hoarding through penalties and financial 
restrictions on wheat trading.  
 
The policy response to the food price crisis focused on preventing future price shortages and 
price spirals. This was done primarily by revising the wheat procurement policy, as laid out 
by the 2008 National Task Force report, by increasing procurement prices so that they are 
close to world prices. To protect the consumer from high prices, the government started a 
national social protection programme in the form of the BISP and the Punjab government 
begun providing bread at a subsidised rate under the sasti roti programme. At the provincial 
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and local level, to deal with hoarding and to regulate prices, the Bureau of Supply and Prices 
was revived.  
 
The proposed food security policy is useful as a guiding document for the newly created 
Ministry of National Food Security and Research. Whether the policy will have a discernible 
impact on food price volatility in the coming years remains to be seen, as the policy is 
currently a set of proposed plans without targets or operational plans. The policy speaks of 
increasing agricultural productivity by improving water management, access to research and 
extension services, and developing supply-chains. These ideas are similar to previous 
policies and have received limited traction with respect to implementation or delivery 
(Balagamwala and Gazdar 2013). There are two areas, however, where the proposed policy 
appears to depart from current practice. First, there is reference to a redesign of the wheat 
procurement system by limiting procurement only to maintain strategic reserves and for 
distribution of grain to vulnerable groups targeted through food vouchers. This contrasts with 
the recommendation of the 2008 National Task Force to limit the goals of procurement policy 
to the prevention of shortages and price volatility, and using social protection systems for 
ensuring household food security. Second, the new policy proposes to protect consumers 
from price fluctuations in the international market through price controls in the form of 
minimum and maximum prices. Current practice, also emerging from the 2008 National Task 
Force, is based on the premise that it is counter-productive to attempt to insulate local 
markets from global prices in Pakistan. 
 
The impact of food price volatility in 2008-2009 on poverty has been controversial. The fact 
that price volatility coincided with a domestic and then global economic recession further 
compounded possible causal factors. While it was widely expected that poverty would have 
risen, household data failed to show an unambiguous trend. Increase in the share of food in 
total consumption expenditure between 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 can be interpreted as 
indicating a rise in poverty – given that poorer population segments spend a higher 
proportion of their incomes of food. The issue is confounded by the fact, however, that there 
were no major changes in the composition of food expenditure between 2007-08 and 2010-
11 - while cereal consumption increased a little so did the consumption of expensive items 
such as cooking fats and fruits. A more detailed analysis of household data, something 
outside the remit of the present study, is needed to resolve this conundrum. Our initial 
analysis of secondary data, particularly the comparison of the consumption of the poorest 
and the richest households in the distribution, are useful to set the scene for the qualitative 
study of food consumption which follows (Section 5). The secondary data show that while the 
consumption of cereals differed only marginally between the poorest and the richest, there 
was a great deal of variation in the consumption of nutritious foods such as high quality fats 
(butter), eggs, meat and fresh fruit. This suggests that the poorest were, on average, meeting 
their consumption requirements of the main staple, but not other food groups. Secondary 
data do not, of course, provide a finer account of variations around the average among the 
poorest, or fluctuations around the average over time. 
3 Method and approach 
3.1 Approach to longitudinal qualitative community case studies  
A common research methodology has been developed for the Life in a Time of Food Price 
Volatility project which has been adapted in each country to fit the local context. A 
longitudinal qualitative case study approach is being utilised whereby communities selected 
in each country will be visited once a year for four years (between 2012 and 2015). 
Qualitative methods have been used to collect information on a variety of topics to document 
reported changes in the lives of poor and vulnerable communities. The purpose of the 
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research is to understand if changes in price of food (both in terms of increase and volatility) 
affect overall well-being, to explore the mechanisms through which this impact takes place 
and the response to changing prices and food availability. A detailed discussion of the 
rationale behind the project and the methodology used is available in the global report titled 
“Squeezed” (Hossain et al. 2013).  
 
In each country two sites – one rural and one urban – were selected in round 1 of the primary 
fieldwork which in Pakistan was carried out in October 2012. These sites were then revisited 
the following year in September/October 2013. Sites were selected after consultation with the 
Oxfam team in Pakistan keeping in mind that the neighbourhoods or villages selected had a 
sizeable population of poor and vulnerable households and were reflective as much as 
possible of other poor communities in Pakistan. These sites are to serve as ‘listening posts’ 
for four years to determine perceptions of food security of the community and individual 
households and to track changes over time (Hossain et al. 2013). 
 
Methods and tools 
In the first year, a community profile was carried out in each site through which information 
on socio-economic characteristics and demographic features of the site and infrastructure in 
the area were collected. The community profile was conducted with a group of respondents 
in different neighbourhoods or villages of each research site. It was ensured that the chosen 
respondents had knowledge about the community and about the households living in the 
site. A social-mapping of the area was carried out to understand the social structure of the 
village/neighbourhood in which a listing of different social groups present in the site was 
done along with an enquiry about their livelihoods, asset ownership, education, economic 
status and food security condition. Through the information collected in the community 
profile, the field team was able to select respondents for further interviews. Participants 
selected were those who were willing to be interviewed and those with ‘longitudinal potential’ 
i.e. those who were okay with the field team re-surveying them an annual basis.  
Semi-structured research instruments have been used to collect in-depth qualitative data 
developed for the following type of interactions: 
 
• Key informant interviews  
• In-depth household interviews  
• Focus group discussions. 
 
Key informant interviews 
We carried out five interviews with key informants in Dadu and six interviews in the first year 
in Karachi to gather information about the research site, the standard of living of different 
socio-economic groups, sources of support available and changes in recent years. Examples 
of key informant interviews include a lady health worker, a tenant farmer and a large 
landowner in Dadu and a doctor, shopkeeper and retired government employee in Karachi. It 
was ensured that at least one key informant selected was a woman. In Year 2, we were able 
to interview the same key informants in Dadu and four of the original key informants in 
Karachi – one key informant who headed a social organisation had moved out of the 
neighbourhood and while another, a doctor, was unwell. To bring up the number to the 
required five interviews, we added one more key informant in Karachi who was a mid-wife. 
 
In-depth household interviews 
In each site, ten households were selected for detailed interviews. Purposive sampling was 
done to ensure that at least one household of the following type was selected: female-
headed households, BISP beneficiary households, socially marginalised households, 
households belonging to a dominant social group, religious minority, households with 
salaried workers, households with daily wage earners, (in the rural site) agricultural 
household with no own land, (in the rural site) agricultural household with own land and (in 
the urban site) recent migrants. In 9 out of 10 household interviews in each site, the primary 
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respondent was an adult woman responsible for managing the household. In Year 2, we 
were able to re-interview all the 20 households selected in Year 1; however, in two 
households in Dadu and Karachi the primary respondent was different to the one interviewed 
in the earlier round.  
 
Household interviewees were asked about demographic and socio-economic information 
about the household which included occupations and income of all household members, 
socio-economic characteristics of the household, social standing of the household in the 
community, details about asset ownership and liabilities, food consumption behaviour, 
whether the household benefitted from governmental and non-governmental social protection 
programmes along with other questions of interest to the research.  
 
Focus group discussions 
In each site, four focus group discussions (FGD) were carried out, each consisting of five to 
six participants belonging to low-income households. The four focus groups can be 
categorised as follows: adult males, young males, adult women and young women. In the 
second round of qualitative fieldwork, the field team tried to maintain a core FGD participant 
group and were able to gather same participants as Year 1 for some groups while in others 
more than half of the participants were same as in Year 1 and the other half were replaced 
with new respondents with similar profiles as those that had dropped out.  
In Year 1, a food basket exercise for also carried out in which respondents were asked to 
compile a food basket representing daily food consumption of a typical household in the 
research site. The purpose of this exercise was to document how well people eat to be able 
to understand how well they live and how their well-being is affected by changes in prices.  
 
Ethical considerations and data management 
At the beginning of each interview, respondents were informed about the research project 
and verbal consent was sought before starting the interview. Respondents were also 
informed about the qualitative nature of this study and were asked whether they would be 
willing to be interviewed in multiple rounds of the survey. Where permission was given, the 
interview was also recorded.  
 
Interviews were conducted in local languages (mostly Sindhi) and were transcribed in the 
same language. These transcripts were then translated into English. In the second round, 
however, the data collection strategy was altered and instead of transcriptions field 
researchers wrote up detailed notes which were then translated into English. Each 
interaction and each respondent have been given a code and detailed metadata labels have 
been created for all interview notes/transcripts using a standardised format which has been 
used in all project countries. 
4 Research sites 
Rationale for site selection 
For our rural site we selected villages in three administrative units of Taluka Johi of district 
Dadu in the province of Sindh which are situated about 15 kilometres from district 
headquarters. Our research site consists of a large village of about 250 households which is 
surrounded by smaller villages which have as few as 15 households. This district was 
selected for the following reasons: 
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 At the recommendation of the Oxfam team in Pakistan.  
 This was a disaster affected area - about three-fifths of the population in district Dadu 
were affected by the Indus floods in 2010 and a fifth of the population was affected by 
floods in 2011(OCHA 2010; OCHA/UNDP 2012). 
 Rural Dadu is an agricultural area where wheat, one of the main staple commodities of 
Pakistan, is grown. 
 
The research site selected had been affected by the floods in 2010 – some villages within 
our site had to be evacuated as flood water had entered the village while other villages faced 
heavy rains without need for evacuation. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood in this 
area. There is only one major crop grown here in a year which is wheat, grown in the rabi 
season (October to April). Because the area lies at the tail end of canals, there is no water in 
available in the summer and therefore no crop is grown. In the main village in our research 
site, located about 3 kilometres from the main road, there is electricity but most households 
do not receive gas and use wood or animal-dung as source of fuel. Although gas pipelines 
were laid in the area in 2012 only one household in our sample – one of the better off ones - 
had started receiving gas in 2013. There are government schools available for boys, and 
while there is a school for girls present it is not functional. As a result, girls in this village are 
not usually sent to school. There is a Basic Health Unit in the village and Lady Health 
Workers are active in this area. The smaller villages of the area do not have any education 
and health facilities. There are many households who are beneficiaries of the Benazir 
Income Support Programme receiving monthly cash transfers and some households have 
also received compensation for flood damage through the Watan Card [the government of 
Pakistan’s cash transfer scheme for citizens affected by floods in 2010]. 
 
For our urban site low-income mohallas (neighbourhoods) in UC-12 of Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town 
in Karachi were selected. The site was selected for the following reasons: 
 
 Karachi is the largest city in Pakistan; a low income area in Karachi is well-reflective of 
the impact of food price volatility on the lives of urban residents 
 While the residents of the field site selected belong to the working class, it is not the 
poorest neighbourhood in Karachi 
 The areas selected are multi-ethnic and a large proportion of residents are migrants. 
Some have recently migrated especially following the floods in 2010 and 2011 while the 
others have been living in Karachi for a few years 
 The Collective team had previously conducted research around this area and had 
contacts with individuals living in the area who eventually become resource persons and 
helped in arranging interviews. 
 
A majority of the households in our urban site are Sindhi speaking but there is a sizeable 
representation of Seraiki, Punjabi and Pushto speaking households as well. One of the 
neighbourhoods in the site has a large population of Christians, a religious minority in 
Karachi, as well. Residents of the area are involved in a variety of occupations; some have 
government jobs and private sector jobs and are paid on a monthly basis but a large 
proportion earns on a daily basis either as unskilled labourers or through self-employment 
(e.g. rickshaw drivers). Women who work usually do as maids in nearby middle class 
localities. All households have electricity and gas but there is no supply of drinking water and 
many households have to pay for tankers which supply them with water. There is a local 
committee set-up in the area to which residents pay a monthly sum for providing services 
such as water and sanitation; however, many respondents said this committee is largely 
ineffective. Private schooling and health facilities are usually used by residents of the 
neighbourhood. These are present in the area but for serious health concerns larger 
government or charity hospitals in Karachi are utilised.  
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Social groups and hierarchies 
In the rural site, the patrilineal kinship group is a defining characteristic of social organisation. 
Individuals and households are identified as belonging to particular kinship groups, some of 
which are arrayed as clans or tribes with clear leadership structures. There is one dominant 
kinship group in the area, in terms of political power, strength of social bonds, leadership 
structures and land ownership, and its chieftain or Raees is the largest landowner as well as 
the local member of the legislature. He is cited as presiding over dispute arbitrations not only 
among his own tribe but also among other kinship groups of the area. He enjoys an 
exceptional position in the survey site by virtue of the fact that his own ancestral village is 
located here. 
 
While members of the Raees’ tribe are generally more powerful and prosperous compared 
with other kinship groups, not all of them are wealthy. There are some among the Raees’ 
tribe who have smaller land holdings, and also some who are landless. Other landowners are 
from the Qambranis and the Punjabis – both of whom are close political allies of the Raees. 
These other landowning groups, therefore, contribute to the political power of the Raees as 
well as his domination of the social organisation. Lower kinship groups include the Mallah 
(traditionally fisherfolk), Manganhar (traditionally drum-beaters), Hajjam (traditionally 
barbers), and Shaikh (traditionally sweepers and beggars). 
 
While on first view the social ordering between kinship groups and its correlation with 
economic class and political power seems like an insular vertical hierarchy, in fact there is 
much fluidity, agency and negotiation in evidence. The Raees is able to maintain his primary 
position largely through his access to political resources by the virtue of being a legislator. 
While we heard the general story of there being little choice but for dependent voters to 
support the Raees, there were also cases of individual agency. A number of respondents 
claimed that they happened to be supporters of the political party with which the Raees was 
affiliated and if he switched parties they would remain with their preferred party. We also 
came across openly expressed dissent by those who felt that they had been treated unfairly 
by the Raees’s tribe. The Raees commanded much support not simply for being Raees but 
due to the public resources he was credited with having brought to local residents: ‘when the 
Raees is in government people have money, when not they lose their jobs’ (a young female 
participant of a FGD). The economic position of the Raees as a major landowner was also 
seen by many as linking their fortunes with his. One key informant was of the view, for 
example, that when the Raees and his family took a more active interest in farming their 
lands the entire community benefited through higher productivity and employment. Higher 
prices of agricultural produce led the Raees as well as other landowners to invest more in 
land. The authority, therefore, was at least partly based on transactional relations between 
kinship groups, classes and individuals. The kinship group hierarchy in general and the 
Raees in particular were part of the informal social arrangements relied upon by many 
residents in the face of adverse shock. 
 
The maintenance of vertical power relations between kinship groups, however, was also 
premised on conflict and threats. Dissenters complained that their children were bullied at 
school by children from more powerful families, and that they were vulnerable to crime such 
as cattle theft, and the filing of false police cases against family members. The fact that such 
dissenters were able to speak openly about their concerns, however, was itself an indicator 
of the agency and fluidity in the hierarchical order. Another factor was the relative internal 
autonomy of subservient kinship groups in their own matters. While political and economic 
domination was articulated through the kinship group – notably the tribe of the Raees – it 
was also true others count on the support of their own kinship groups. This too accounts for a 
negotiated rather than imposed balance of political power and social structure. These other 
kinship groups also act as primary sources of consumption support. 
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In some ways the situation in the urban site could hardly be more different. Even though 
many of the migrants in this area are from precisely the type of rural communities observed 
in our rural site, they have not migrated en masse and clearly not with the social and class 
hierarchies intact. While the settlement has witnessed various forms of collective action over 
the decades, mainly with respect to getting the locality regularised, community-level 
organisations function only exceptionally. There had been one attempt to form a local 
committee to look after the provision of public goods and dispute arbitration, but this 
collapsed due to lack of interest on the part of individuals. There were also cases of some 
local individuals – such as professionals or government officers residing in the settlement – 
to organise collective action. Most of these attempts proved to be short-lived. 
The locality is ethnically heterogeneous but that neither accounts for the lack of collective 
action, nor does it lead to overt ethnic conflict. In fact, most respondents believe that various 
ethnic groups get along. Younger men expressed concerns about ethnic discrimination and 
the effects of newly-arrived migrants on labour market opportunities for older residents. 
There were also ethnic perceptions based on the reputation of particular groups for their 
ability to use violence. Despite the salience of ethnicity in a number of narratives about social 
organisation, individual agency seemed to matter a great deal. There was some evidence 
that ethnic identity played some role in the support extended to those who had experienced 
adverse shocks – such as flood displaced persons. But there were also tensions between 
landlord and tenants of the same ethnicity, and conflicts among individuals belonging to the 
same ethnic group, and solidarity across ethnic lines. 
 
In terms of social hierarchy, the most conspicuous line was that between the most recent 
migrants and those who had been in Karachi for several decades. There was an economic 
dimension to this too, with older migrants cohorts being more likely to be counted among 
property owners and newer migrants being tenants. Some of the rural hierarchies associated 
with identity were transplanted into Karachi, but since a large proportion of the residents 
were from ‘lower’ kinship groups in their places of origin these identities mainly signified poor 
endowments rather than active prejudice. The fact that the floods had adversely affected the 
position of some who might be regarded as high in the rural hierarchy had also made matters 
less straightforward. Words like ‘respect’ and ‘honour’ were used to speak about relative 
social position. Contradictory opinions about sources of respect –‘respect comes from 
education not eating well’, but also that ‘those who eat well are respected’, or that ‘money 
leads to respect’ – reflected the overall ambivalence towards older norms. Many women 
worked as maids and cleaners in other people’s houses – something that would have been 
considered ‘disgraceful’ for them in their home villages. These women now shared their 
status with those for whom it was already a norm in the village to work in other people’s 
houses. 
Livelihoods, work, wages and risk 
Both sites were selected, as explained above, to ensure the representation of poor and food 
insecure individuals and households. They were relatively marginal areas in the rural and 
urban contexts, respectively, but not necessarily the most marginal or the poorest. Although 
there has been much diversification away from agriculture in the Pakistani economy, 
agriculture still accounts for a majority of the workforce in rural areas. The country’s most 
productive agrarian regions, and those which account for a majority of the rural population, 
are irrigated floodplains along the Indus basin. Non-irrigated regions consist, for the most 
part, of arid and semi-arid areas which depend on unreliable rainfall for crop cultivation, or 
rangeland for pasture. In terms of the agrarian economy our rural site stood somewhere 
between high productivity irrigated areas and areas without irrigation. Irrigation water is 
available in our sample villages for half the year – or for one major crop in the annual cycle. 
Land ownership is dominated by a few large landlords in these villages, who own upwards of 
100 acres, some much more. There are also smaller landowners whose holdings might be 
limited to a few acres. A large number of farmers, however, are individuals who do not own 
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any land. They are sharecropping tenants for the most part, though there are also some who 
have taken land on fixed rental leases from landowners. Sharecropping was originally on a 
half-share basis, with the landowner and sharecropper entitled to half the total harvest. 
Under that arrangement the landlord, obviously, supplied (irrigated) land, and the 
sharecropper supplied labour and draught power. Other inputs were usually shared equally 
between the two. Since many of the inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides are now 
purchased from the market, the landowner usually buys them and deducts the tenant’s share 
of input costs from the latter’s share of the harvest. Tractors have replaced bullocks for 
draught power, and the rental and fuel payments of these machines are also borne by the 
landowner in the first instance, and then recovered from the tenant’s harvest share. The fixed 
rental contract is usually taken by those tenants who are able to finance the production cycle 
from their own resources, and is more profitable for the tenant than sharecropping. 
 
Then there are households which rely on the farm economy as labourers. Harvest season – 
late March in these villages which rely on the winter wheat crop – is the busiest time for 
labourers. At other times they take up any other labour work which becomes available in 
construction or the service sector. Households which rely mostly on casual labour are likely 
to be poorer compared to those farming their own or tenanted land. Harvest labour is paid in 
kind and entire households are involved in this work. For the landless poor harvest labour is 
the main source of acquiring grain stocks for their own consumption, and a household with 2-
3 able-bodied adult workers can earn up to the equivalent of half a year’s supply of grain. For 
other forms of casual employment such as in the service and construction sectors, workers 
travel to nearby towns and are paid daily wages. In 2012 the daily wage rate was Rs.200 to 
300 (US$2.10 to 3.10), while in 2013 it was 300 to 400 (US$2.80 to 3.80).  
The most sought after employment in the rural site – and in the urban one – is a salaried 
government job. These jobs generally come with employment security and relatively higher 
earnings. In the rural site a number of individuals – mostly men – had government jobs. 
Some of them were located in the village or nearby towns, while others had moved to bigger 
cities and sent remittances to their households back in the village. The local member of the 
legislature, who is the chieftain (Raees) of the dominant tribe in this region, and a major 
landowner, is a key source of livelihoods for farmers as well as government employees. 
Many of the landless farmers in the area are tenants of the Raees. He is also credited with 
having used his influence in government to place many of his constituents, particularly those 
from his own village, into sought-after public sector jobs. 
The urban site which is at a distance of around 10 km 
from the city centre developed as an irregular settlement 
of rural-urban migrants some 30 years ago. It is adjacent 
to a number of planned localities which were aimed to 
house middle class families. The locality existed as an 
informal settlement without security of tenure until it was 
regularised and provided with public infrastructure such 
as electricity and gas connection and in the case of 
some households, water supply. While a number of 
residents can be classified as being middle class – with 
government jobs, or in the professions – a majority of the 
inhabitants are relatively poor and dependent on casual 
labour, insecure jobs, and low-wage self-employment in 
the service sector. These include jobs in the transport 
sector, small-scale vending, and various other jobs for 
which workers get paid on a daily wage basis. Male 
casual labourers can expect to earn around Rs.400 to 
500 (US$4.80 to 5.80) as the daily wage rate. Many of 
the women in the locality work as maids and cleaners in 
Picture 1: A resident of the urban site 
prepares sweet potato for sale. Small-scale 
vending is a common occupation in low-
income areas of Karachi. Photo: Naila 
Mahmood 
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the houses of better-off households within the locality as well as in the surrounding planned 
localities. They usually earn around Rs.7,000 (about US$ 67) monthly. Many of the residents 
are relatively recent migrants from rural areas – some of whom arrived here due to flood-
related displacement in 2010 and 2011. The residents are from a variety of ethnic groups 
corresponding to their places of origin in Pakistan (as well as outside). 
There is a conspicuous division in this locality between those who own their houses and 
those who live in rented accommodation. Tenants are mostly relatively recent rural-urban 
migrants. Many of the homeowners are themselves rural-urban migrants from earlier periods 
who were able to establish themselves in the locality. Some are individuals who arrived in the 
city several decades ago and acquired entry-level public sector jobs. Some homeowners 
who are relatively affluent, own several properties in the locality which they rent out. Rents 
range from just around Rs.1,000 (US$9.50) monthly for an empty plot with a makeshift 
structure, to Rs.4,000 to 5,000 (US$38 to 48), or the equivalent of half the official minimum 
wage. 
Even though residents of the urban 
sites potentially have access to diverse 
sources of livelihood compared with 
their rural counterparts, government 
salaried jobs are considered highly 
valuable here too. These jobs are 
associated with security of employment 
and a stable and regular income. In 
both areas it was reported that 
government jobs were only open to 
people with some minimal educational 
qualifications. Beyond that, connections 
with influential individuals or outright 
payments of bribes to recruiting officials 
were considered necessary conditions 
for acquiring a government job. 
In both areas, at the bottom of the 
economic scale, there were households 
which relied on charity and begging to make ends. Qualitative research was able to focus 
attention on this group which is often ignored in larger sample surveys. While details of 
charity and begging with respect to food acquisition are provided further below, a number of 
observations are pertinent at the outset. We need to acknowledge begging as a livelihood 
source and not merely as an aberration from the conventional definition of livelihoods around 
paid work. Some households involved in begging cite it as a traditional occupation, while 
others claim to have been reduced to begging by economic circumstances. Knowledge about 
begging and households depending on begging is well-known within communities and there 
are culturally rooted norms which account for the steady circulation of resources to the 
‘sector’. There seems to be a continuum of giving and receiving between reciprocal 
exchange, charity, and outright begging. An understanding of begging, therefore, is important 
not only for its own sake, but for a more general view on informal sources of support in 
communities. 
There are several conspicuous sources of risk and uncertainty, other than those related to 
price volatility, in the rural and urban site. Ill-health, accidental injury or the untimely death of 
a household member, particularly an adult, is a frequently cited source of shock in rural and 
urban areas alike. In the case of illness or injury, households make extraordinary efforts to 
secure the best possible treatment they can afford. According to poor rural informants, health 
contingency is when they really need cash – far more than they require cash for food 
Picture 2: Mrs K’s house in Karachi is an empty plot with a makeshift 
structure. She pays Rs. 1,000 (US$ 9.50) a month as rent. Photo: Naila 
Mahmood 
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purchases. Even when families refer to public sector health facilities they do bear 
considerable out-of-pocket expenses in relation to their income levels. In urban areas 
informants cite additional health-related issues such as drug addiction which impose serious 
burdens on families. When a health contingency or untimely death relates to an adult the 
household suffers doubly – it needs to pay for expenses, and also loses a potential earner (in 
case of an adult male) or primary care-giver and earner (in case of an adult female). 
The effects of environmental shocks – notably the floods of 2010 and 2011 – were 
conspicuous in the rural as well as the urban site. Some parts of the rural site were directly 
affected by rains and floods, and families had lost their homes, household belongings, stocks 
of grain and livestock. In the urban site we found several families who had migrated from 
their homes due to the floods. For them migration was a coping strategy, and assistance they 
were offered by relatives and others in the urban area added to the help received from 
government. Another source of environmental shock in the rural area was the erratic 
availability of irrigation water in the cropping season. This is due to fluctuations in water 
availability in the system as well as governance issues in the allocation of irrigation water 
supply to various users. 
Conflict is an ever-present source of risk and uncertainty in rural and urban areas alike, even 
if it manifests itself differently between the sites. Among our sample cases, conflict within 
families is often associated with the breakup of households. In some cases this is caused by 
economic adversity while in others it becomes the cause of economic hardship. At the other 
end of the spectrum, political conflict also has a direct impact on the livelihoods of the poor. 
In the urban site, for example, days of politically-motivated strikes are cited as particularly 
difficult moments for daily wage earners, and those who rely on daily purchasing of 
household groceries. The effects of the closure of CNG (compressed natural gas) stations 
(due to government-imposed rationing of natural gas consumption) are similar, as many of 
the workers in the urban site depend on the CNG-fuelled transport sector for their livelihood. 
For other casual labourers and self-employed workers like petty vendors, the shut-down of 
public transport due to a strike or CNG closure implies the loss of a day’s earnings. 
While rural households fear conflict with powerful landowning families because of the belief 
that the latter can manipulate the police against the poor, or because they can evict the poor 
from tenancies, for the urban poor who live in rented homes the fear of eviction is a real one. 
According to one poor rural-urban migrant who faced difficulties meeting the rent rise 
imposed by her landlord, she would be forced to ‘live in a tent’. Indeed, there was one family 
in our sample which lived in a makeshift tent-like dwelling on an empty plot for which they 
paid a small rent. 
We also have several cases in both rural and urban areas of individuals and households 
whose livelihoods have been adversely affected by vulnerability to crime. In some cases 
crime and economic threats are correlated with local power relations. One sharecropper in 
the rural site who had been involved in a conflict with their landlords over crop-sharing had 
been implicated in a court case in which he was acquitted. The family felt vulnerable to 
frequent thefts of livestock and other valuables which they attributed to their former landlords. 
In the urban site, one respondent had to give up his barber’s shop because of frequent 
threats of extortion, and violence at the hands of non-paying customers. The fact that his 
tormentors were considered to be affiliated with a relatively more powerful political grouping 
made him particularly helpless. 
Gender relations 
The respective roles and agency of men and women with regards to livelihood, care and food 
consumption are strongly influenced by dominant social norms in rural and urban areas alike. 
While care and food consumption within the household is seen almost exclusively as the 
female domain, earning and providing resources for care and consumption is regarded as 
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the male area of responsibility. There are norms too regarding the mobility of women and 
older girls in the public sphere which is generally regarded as a male space. Women’s work 
outside the context of the household – on someone else’s farm or home – is regarded as a 
mark of low status. These norms, therefore, are often observed in the breach particularly by 
the poor. 
 
In the rural site many of the women take part in remunerative work, not only in various 
agricultural activities but in home-based activities such as sewing and embroidery. When 
they earn cash there is a clear idea about their own income in contrast with the income 
earned by male adults within the household. The same is true for the cash transfer which a 
number of women in our sample received. Even so, it is strongly believed that it is the 
responsibility of men to provide resources for care and consumption. Women’s involvement 
in agricultural activity includes farm work on the household’s own or sharecropped/leased 
land. It includes tending to livestock, and taking part in the wheat harvest. Some women in 
the rural site also work at times in the homes of well-off families. This is generally viewed as 
an undesirable activity, and one of our informants who does occasionally work in other 
people’ houses was at great pains to point out that she does so only very rarely and also due 
to strong personal bonds. 
 
Gender-based norms for care and livelihoods are similar in the urban site. Women feel more 
mobile, however, and many women from poor households in our fieldwork site work as maids 
or cleaners in other people’s houses. We have already referred to a case above which 
illustrates the supposed trade-off between respect and wages with regards to women 
working in other people’s homes. Sometimes women domestic workers get food from their 
employers, but this is not always the case, and often this food is stale. Women in the urban 
site are more burdened by the work-care pressure than their rural counterparts, possibly 
because of the availability of other close relatives in the village. They feel guilty about leaving 
their children behind and end up making special arrangements for care, or having children 
not cared for at all. In Mrs M’s household, for example, an older sibling stayed away from 
school to look after younger children when the mother went out to work. Like their rural 
counterparts, many urban women are also involved in home-based work such as sewing and 
embroidery. 
Local markets and prices 
We asked respondents about prices of basic commodities that were consumed regularly by 
households in their neighbourhood. Table 4.1 compiles responses that were received for 
selected items.25 Prices of most food items increased over the two rounds of data collection 
while wages and salaries (in terms of cash) increased in Dadu but remained the same in 
Karachi across various occupation groups. Daily wages for unskilled labourers estimated in 
terms of wheat flour show that wage labourers in Karachi are able to purchase more wheat 
with their wages than unskilled labourers in Dadu. However, there appears to have been a 
slight improvement in Dadu in this respect across survey rounds but deterioration in wheat 
equivalent wages in Karachi. There was not much difference in prices of food items in rural 
and urban areas barring a few commodities such as milk which was significantly cheaper in 
Dadu, wheat which was marginally more expensive in Karachi and rice which was cheaper in 
Karachi. Milk is cheaper in rural areas as it is produced there and as it is a perishable item, 
households retain enough milk for own consumption and selloff the excess. Similarly, wheat 
is also produced in Dadu explaining the lower price there. Rice is one commodity that is 
cheaper in Karachi than in Dadu – this is because rice is not produced in our rural site and 
Karachi has a more developed market, and thus is more likely to have lower prices.  
                                               
25  For Karachi, price data we collected was compared with official price data collected by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 
(PBS) for the same period and was found to be in line with secondary data. A similar comparison could not be done for 
Dadu as the PBS only collects data from specific urban centres. 
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Table 4.1 Wages and prices in research sites  
 Dadu Karachi 
 2012 2013 2012  2013 
Food     
Wheat flour (kg) 30 - 35 40 32-40 40-45 
Rice (kg) 70-80 90 – 100 60-70 75 
Pulses (kg) 60 - 90 120 - 160 80 – 120 80 – 120 
Potatoes (kg) 25-30 20 - 30 15-20 20-30 
Ladyfingers (kg) 30-40 60-70 60 70-80 
Milk (litre) 40 – 50 50 – 60 75 75-80 
Chicken (kg) 200-250 240 – 300 220 240-300 
Sugar (kg) 70 – 80 50 – 60 40-45 50-56 
Agricultural Inputs     
Urea (per sack) 1,800 1,960   
Fertiliser (per sack) 3,000-4,000 4,300-4,500   
Tractor/plough (per hour) 1,000-1,100 1,200-1,300   
Rent No rent Increase of 500 – 1,000 
Wages     
Unskilled labour (per day) 200-300 300-400 400-500 400-500  
Rickshaw driver (per day) 200-500 300-500  150-400 200-400 
Private job (per month)   8,000 – 10,000 8,000 – 10,000 
Wheat equivalent (unskilled 
labour) in kg 
6 – 10 7.5 to 10 10 – 15.5 10 – 12.5 
Prices are in Pakistan Rupees. In 2012, US$1 = Rs.95.35 and in 2013, US$1 = Rs.105.25 
Source: Author’s own 
 
5 Food, hunger and coping 
5.1 Food economy: access and acquisition 
Our fieldwork in this project builds on earlier qualitative fieldwork on food consumption and 
security in Pakistan in the context of price and supply shocks (Gazdar and Mallah 2010). It 
confirms and extends the finding of previous research that for many of the poorest – in both 
rural and urban areas – livelihood activities revolve around their food economy. Access to 
and acquisition of food, often basic staples, defines and shapes much else. This perspective 
moves the food economy to a central position in place of the view that regards food 
commodities as simply some, albeit more important, elements in a portfolio of consumption 
expenditure. We reiterate the finding that for the poorest individuals and households other 
activities and preferences are subsequent to the acquisition of staple foods. 
In the rural site the food economy revolves around the wheat crop which is sown in the winter 
and harvested in late March and while all households regardless of occupation are part of 
this food economy, interaction with it varies across occupation groups. A household member 
in government employment can lead to a degree of insulation from the local wheat crop and 
allows for monthly budgeting and more secure and stable access to food. It also leads to 
improved access to credit from retailers who are confident in the salaried individual’s ability 
to repay her or his debts. The high value placed on government jobs, even in the rural site, is 
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indicative of the importance people attach to the food security which comes from a 
predictable income stream. Rural households with members in government jobs, however, 
remain part of the local wheat cycle, depending on their land ownership and tenancy status. 
For landless households tenancy – mostly sharecropping – is considered to be a source of 
greater food security than recourse to casual labour. Even after all deductions, a 
sharecropping tenant is usually left with sufficient grain to last the annual cycle. Moreover, if 
grain does run out before the subsequent harvest, sharecropping tenants are able to acquire 
wheat on loan from their landlords who then deduct these advances from the coming 
harvest. In fact, there is an active circulation of grains between landowners, tenants and local 
retailers. The latter maintain grain accounts and charge mark-ups on grain advances either in 
terms of cash or in terms of grain itself. 
 
Picture 3: Wheat is stored in containers made of metal and mud in our rural site. Almost all households acquire grain during 
harvest season and consume it over the year. Photo: Collective team 
Landless households that rely on wage labour rather than sharecropping are also involved, 
almost universally in the wheat crop cycle. Harvesting remains a labour-intensive activity and 
is an important source of grain for the landless. As noted above, landless households with 
able-bodied adults (including at least one male) can earn sufficient grain from in-kind wages 
for harvesting work to last them six months. We found that some of these households were 
also involved in selling grain to local shops in order to raise cash for pressing needs such as 
health care. The arrival in this area recently of combined harvesters had led to some decline 
in the demand for harvest labour. The wheat crop cycle is also a source of food for those 
who may not be involved in agricultural work at all. One case study household belonging to a 
traditional beggar family reported that they acquired grain at harvest time from various 
cultivators simply through begging. If the crop was good they received more alms. They also 
sold part of what they acquired to finance cash expenses. 
While wheat is clearly the most important food item in the rural site, the circulation of food is 
not limited to the staple. Livestock rearing for dairy is an important part of the agricultural 
economy. Livestock ownership is not limited to those with land, though landowners and 
tenant farmers are clearly at an advantage because they dedicate part of their holdings to 
fodder cultivation. Livestock is also a common form of saving. Some form of grazing is 
possible free of charge on uncultivated land, and there are also instances of fodder being 
given free of cost. Poor households often rear farm animals on a share-basis with the 
owners. They are responsible for the upkeep of the animal, can use the milk, and share in 
the profit once the adult animal is sold. Some households keep others’ animals for a cash 
fee. There is a seasonal element to this work, as animals are not driven outdoors in the 
winter for the fear of damaging the wheat crop. 
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Traditionally, milk production was mostly consumed within the community, and a household’s 
surplus milk was provided free of cost to other village residents. Milk by-products such as 
lassi (a yoghurt-based drink) were also shared freely. While some such sharing is still in 
evidence there has been some decline due to the commodification of milk and dairy 
products. A milk packaging company set up a collection centre near the village in 2012 but it 
was shut down in 2013. This may have had some impact on the overall availability of milk for 
consumption and circulation within the village. A major source of demand for milk comes 
from local tea-shops which buy up large quantities. 
Other food items are also sometimes available free of cost to local residents. Saag, or the 
edible leafy part of the mustard plant which is grown primarily for its oilseed is available in the 
winter and is provided by farmers to those who ask for it. We even came across households 
in our urban sites which have rural links and received saag during its season from the village. 
Some landless rural informants report that they sometimes obtain seasonal vegetables free 
of cost from farmers. 
Households in the urban site are obviously much more dependent on the market for their 
food. There were some urban households with rural links who receive grain from the village, 
as well as the cases noted above of saag being sent from the rural area. For the most part, 
however, even recent rural-urban migrants in our urban site were entirely dependent on local 
purchasing. Urban households with government jobs, like their rural counterparts, plan their 
food acquisition over the monthly salary cycle. Others rely on more frequent purchasing from 
local retailers. There are variations in the quality of food available in or near the urban site, 
and the poor generally compromise on quality for price. They are also unable to take 
advantage of outlets such as the publicly subsidised Utility Stores because they typically buy 
smaller amounts in each purchase than the portions available at these shops. 
Just as there are urban households in our sample which acquire grain from rural areas, there 
are also rural households among the case studies which rely exclusively on local retailers for 
their acquisition of the staple food. A Kumhar (potter) household is entirely dependent on 
cash earnings from baking clay water carriers and does not have any able-bodied members 
who might take part in harvest labour. They do not hold out for alms and use the cash they 
earn from selling their pots on purchasing wheat flour.  
The existence of a food economy with the circulation of grain as well as some dairy and 
vegetables in the village does not imply that the market is not present. In fact, the market is 
very active. It is only with regard to the main staple that needs are almost entirely met 
through internal circulation. Other items considered to be necessities – such as cooking fat 
(vegetable ghee), spices, milk, tea and sugar are purchased here too from local retailers, or 
from shops in the nearby town. Poorer households, like those in urban areas, make frequent 
purchases and are unable to keep inventories at home. 
In the urban site, but also interestingly, in the rural one, there is a significant market for 
prepared foods even among the poorest. In fact, in the rural and urban site both, biscuits and 
rusks purchased from local retailers were frequently cited as common breakfast foods. 
Pakoras (deep-fried gram-flour fritters) are also commonly consumed as snacks in both sites. 
We also came across instances in both sites of poor households buying cooked curry from 
local restaurants. According to one poor urban household, it was cheaper to buy a portion of 
curry from the restaurant than to cook at home. This is possibly because of the small quantity 
consumed. The same was the case with one rural household whose working males were 
engaged in non-farm work in a nearby town. Many of the working men in both rural and 
urban areas ate their daytime meals at restaurants. The consumption of tea was even more 
common in both areas. These tea-shops and wayside restaurants maintain credit tabs with 
regular customers for the purchase of tea. 
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5.2 What people are eating: hunger and consumption 
Rural and urban informants are similar in terms of the way in which food consumption 
priorities are discussed. The main staple, which happens to be wheat flour in both the sites, 
is the primary concern of most households. This is understandable, given that there are 
many in our sample and in these survey sites that experience actual hunger from time to 
time. In the rural site hunger occurs, for the most part, in the lean season, or when harvested 
grain runs out. Households’ stocks of grain from their own farms, from harvest labour, or 
indeed from alms and charity, see them through part of the year. Even though these 
households may have access to grain loans from landlords or shopkeepers, they are unable 
to fully stave off hunger while they make arrangements for alms or loans. There are also 
some households (such as the Kumhar or potter household mentioned above) who rely on 
frequent purchases of flour, much like a poor urban household. These households can 
experience hunger regardless of the agricultural cycle, because they rely entirely on cash 
purchases from retail outlets for their staple food. 
Although urban households are somewhat better off than their rural counterparts in terms of 
work opportunities, the poorest here also experience hunger at least on some days. In fact, 
their risk of hunger is spread more evenly across the year with hungry days occurring due to 
the lack of cash on a day to day basis. Strikes and transport shutdowns due to the closure of 
CNG stations is an often-cited trigger for a hungry day. While the rural households can call 
upon landlords for alms or credit in terms of grain, urban households need to borrow food 
from their neighbours. For many of the poorest, the availability of the main staple is sufficient 
to stave off hunger on most days. Moreover, demand for the staple appears to be highly 
inelastic – that is, changes in prices or incomes have a minor effect on the consumption of 
the staple food. The idea of need as being related to physical effort is entrenched in the 
rationalisation for coping strategies at moments of shortage. Women in the urban as well as 
the rural site say, for example, that when food is short they ensure that the men have enough 
to eat because they need to go out to work and expend energy. 
When urban and rural informants say they had ‘nothing to eat’, further probing often reveals 
that they had the main staple – roti (wheat flour flatbread) – but nothing to accompany it with. 
Hunger, therefore, is closely associated with frugality in terms of the lack of dietary diversity 
(and micronutrient deficient intakes). The use of chutney made with salt and raw chillies, and 
sweetened black tea, is common in rural and urban sites as accompaniments. Milk, if 
available, might be added to the tea. Those who need to purchase milk say that the more 
money they have the milkier the tea. These accompaniments are used simply to make the 
simple roti more palatable. In the rural site there is also the use of lassi, which as noted 
above, can be available free of cost from neighbours. It is well-understood that these 
accompaniments are of relatively little nutritional value: ‘roti and lassi fill the stomach but the 
body remains weak’ (Mr R, an adult male FGD participant in Dadu).  
When poor households do actually cook, they generally use hydrogenated vegetable fat 
(vegetable ghee) rather than oil because the former is considerably cheaper. Informants in 
both rural and urban sites suggest that oil is healthier than vegetable ghee but they are 
constrained by affordability. Potato is the main cooked accompaniment where available, in 
both rural and urban sites, because it is relatively cheap and easy to make into a curry that 
can feed many mouths. According to Mrs P, a rural informant, ‘we eat potatoes every day 
and often curse them and pray that they burn away, but we still eat them again’. We did not 
hear any complaints about the price of potatoes, even though there was a spike near the 
time of the survey in 2013. 
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This is probably because the price increase 
was short-lived, and also because the 
poorest informants purchase meagre 
quantities of low grade produce. Potato 
curry, therefore, is just a step above chilli 
chutney or sweetened tea. It makes the 
staple more palatable, but is of limited 
nutritional value. For some of the better off 
households in our sample, eating potatoes 
was a response to an adverse shock, while 
the poorest mentioned potato curry as 
something they might have on a good day, 
in place of chutney, sugar or lassi. Women 
who would normally cook vegetables report 
that they often make do with chillies and 
forego preparing a meal if male household 
members are not eating at home.  
While rural households have occasional 
access to seasonal vegetables and saag 
free of cost, in general they, like their urban 
counterparts, say that they eat fresh 
vegetables (other than potatoes) if they have more money. Other foods that people consume 
when they have money include milk, eggs, poultry, fish, meat, and fresh fruit. Most of these 
foods are also cited as the preferred diet of well-off households. The hierarchy of foods, both 
in terms of what the poor themselves eat when they have money, as well as ideas about 
what the well-off eat, corresponds well with ideas about a nutritious diet. There are some 
‘good times’ foods such as rice (in place of wheat flour) and desserts which are mentioned as 
treats which do not have any additional nutritional value. It is also understood that the well-off 
often eat things that are not good for them, particularly in the urban site. There is a view that 
food consumption is as much about income as it is about lifestyle. Middle and upper class 
families ‘whose women do not cook, and tell men to get cooked food’ are regarded by some 
of our poor informants as having acquired Westernised habits.  
Breakfast among the poorest often consists of tea with biscuits or rusks. This is the case in 
both urban and rural areas. Children and men often snack on pakoras. For the somewhat 
better-off, breakfast, might consist of fried flat-bread (paratha) with milk or milky tea, and 
eggs. Some of the poor say breakfast consists of roti with left-over curry from the previous 
night, but the poorest often do not have any curry, leftover or otherwise. In some households 
the main cooked meal is eaten in the afternoon, while in others this status is reserved for the 
evening meal when men are present at home. The main meal is when effort is made to cook 
a curry if possible and on days when money is tight, many said they add more water to curry 
so that a limited quantity feeds more people. Poultry and meat are consumed rarely by the 
poor and even middle-class informants report having it only once a week. 
 
5.3 Local institutions of social protection or support 
This study, in line with much work on food security, takes the household as a natural unit of 
consumption and welfare. Intra-household inequalities in allocation and consumption have 
been widely acknowledged for a long time, and norms about food sharing and the 
sequencing of taking meals have been studied in detail. Our case studies also show gender 
patterns in intra-household food consumption – many of them seemingly enforced by women 
in favour of children and men. We also heard clear voices in rural and urban sites alike about 
the special food needs of women, in the context that they care for everyone else. 
Picture 4: A woman cooking in rural Dadu. The meal consists of 
saag (a local leafy vegetable) and beeh (lotus roots) cooked 
with green chillies, onions and tomatoes along with roti (flat 
bread). Photo: Collective team 
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The idea of the household as a natural unit of consumption and welfare, or an immutable 
primary form of support for individuals, needs to be questioned on grounds other than intra-
household allocation too. While our study confirms the importance of the household as a 
node for food consumption and management, a closer view of the actual eating and food 
sharing arrangements in which individuals are involved reveals much fluidity across 
household boundaries. This is particularly true of households and individuals surviving on the 
margins of food insecurity and hunger. The food-insecure urban informant, Mrs M, who 
sends her children to eat at her mother’s house whenever there is not enough to eat is 
typical of the way in which the household breaks down as a unit of food consumption at 
moments of crisis. At the other end of the spectrum, in the same locality, a relatively well-off 
informant, Mrs G told us that between the first and second rounds of the survey her 
household composition had changed as she had invited a poor niece from the village to 
come and stay with her. The girl did household chores and was looked after in terms of food 
and other needs. 
Households actually break down as social units too due to economic stress, and at times the 
break-up of households due to other reasons leads to severe economic stress and food 
insecurity. Our small sample happens to have ample examples of both such processes. 
There were several instances of marriages having broken down and women having returned 
to their parental homes. There were also cases of men having taken on second wives and 
abandoning their first wives and their children. 
Apart from immediate relatives the main sources of informal local support in the face of 
adverse food shocks came from neighbours in the urban area, and the wider kinship group 
as well landlords and patrons (particularly the Raees) in the rural site. Some of the food 
sharing between urban and rural neighbours is not a response to an adverse shock, but 
simply an institutionalised form of circulation. We have already noted the role of the free 
circulation of lassi and saag in the rural site. It is also common in both sites for small 
quantities of cooked food to be sent to neighbours, particularly if something special has been 
prepared. There may be a religious element to such circulation, as food items that are 
prepared for special events are thought to bring blessings if shared with neighbours and 
relatives and there may be a seasonal element as well since charitable giving increases in 
certain religious months such as Muharram and Ramzan. In any case, some of the sharing of 
cooked foods is part of reciprocal exchange between people of the same status. 
This form of reciprocal exchange does often overlap, however, with charitable assistance. 
Since the motive of the giver might be religious blessings in both such cases, the boundaries 
between the two can be blurred. The difference is that in the case of charitable assistance 
the giver and the receiver are both aware that reciprocity is not required. If the recipient is 
undergoing transitory distress there may be an implied understanding that in time she or he 
will be counted among peers again. 
Beyond a point, however, the hierarchy of status between the giver and the receiver is clearly 
understood in terms of dependence and social obligation. While the circulation of food 
(particularly wheat loans, or even charity) in the rural area makes up for relative food 
insecurity, it is also seen as a social cost. Mrs K, a rural-urban migrant reflected on the 
availability of the staple in the village compared with greater insecurity in the city, ‘this 
(urban) hunger is a blessing compared with being fed but also humiliated in the village by 
patron’. Within the rural site, Mr C, a mason, reflected on the relative food security of beggars 
in the following terms: ‘tenants and labourers can’t beg, can they?’ In the urban site too some 
hierarchical food circulation was observed, for example between landlords and tenants, but 
this was much less frequent or institutionalised than in the rural setting. 
Just as there is some overlap between food circulation between peers and charitable giving, 
so there appears to be a grey area between charitable giving and begging. At the far end are 
professional beggars who are candid that living off alms is their traditional occupation. We 
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have at least one such case in each of the two sites. Then there are those who are very poor 
or have fallen on hard times, and regularly depend on alms for their food consumption. 
Children play a key role, as in the case of fluid household boundaries, in the circulation of 
food even with respect to charity and alms. In the urban site children going over to houses of 
neighbours and asking for any spare food is considered less problematic from the point of 
view of social acceptability than adults doing the same. This underscores the trade-off 
between food security and self-respect noted with regard to the rural site above. 
Several dimensions of informal sources of food support became salient in our fieldwork sites. 
The general social arrangement for the circulation of food forms an institutional basis for food 
support. This circulation is at times strictly transactional, and at times part of a system of 
reciprocal exchange. Giving and receiving among peers too can have an element of informal 
food support, as peers might face idiosyncratic adverse shocks. The religious dimension to 
such food circulation appears to blur the boundaries between peer exchange, charitable 
giving and alms. An implied moral obligation towards children also seems to serve the same 
purpose. Professional begging is sited at the far end of the spectrum with hierarchical 
dependency somewhere in the middle. 
While these arrangements are active and crucial in providing support to vulnerable 
individuals and families, there is also much evidence that the hierarchy implied between 
givers and receivers is not fully internalised. It is clear to all that receiving leads to some loss 
of status and respect. One way of understanding the relationship between poverty, hunger 
and status is through the prism of social interaction. While social interaction was, clearly, a 
key source of informal food support, it was also clear that poverty led to the loss of the ability 
to interact with peers. There was awareness of the tension between moral propriety – i.e. 
retaining respect – and wealth as complementary resources in social interaction. According 
to one young man in the urban site, where crime was otherwise rife, ‘not everyone will opt for 
theft’ in response to poverty. This was similar to statement by a labourer noted above about 
begging. The trade-off between moral boundaries and income came up again in the urban 
women’s FGD where it was revealed that many families encourage young women to take up 
sex work in order to relieve poverty. This was essentially an urban phenomenon where social 
costs to families could be avoided due to the relative anonymity allowed by the city. Whether 
‘respect is more important than food’, or ‘respect comes to someone who eats good food’ 
remained a moot point in our FGDs.  
Formal systems of social protection and support were in evidence in our survey sites. There 
were beneficiaries of the national cash transfer programme – the Benazir Income Support 
Programme or BISP – in both sites, particularly the rural one. In the urban site, as elsewhere 
in Karachi, the poverty scorecard survey used for identifying poor households has serious 
problems in terms of coverage and accuracy. Even if the survey had been conducted 
accurately in the urban site, it is likely that the proportion of beneficiaries would have been 
lower than the rural area, simply due to the higher overall poverty levels in the latter. Be that 
as it may, our own case study respondents, some of whom were selected purposively 
because of their poverty, were mostly not covered by the BISP in the urban site. 
There were multiple ways in which BISP money – Rs.1,000 (US$10.50) monthly in 2012 and 
1,200 (US$11.40) in 2013 – was perceived by the beneficiaries. It was common practice for 
poor households to eat relatively well in the days following the receipt of the cash. Women 
compared BISP cash with private borrowing rather than charity. It was commonly heard that 
‘BISP is good because we do not have to return it’. This observation is important because of 
an often-cited concern that the cash transfer might create dependencies such as those 
related to charity. In fact, a family normally dependent on begging said that they did not beg 
at the time when they received their BISP cash. Moreover, our observations about charity, 
alms and begging show that creation of dependency is perhaps not an unintended 
consequence of vertical informal social support. Rather, personal dependence and the 
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creation or maintenance of hierarchy might be considered integral to private transfers. Some 
BISP recipients, particularly in the rural site, likened the programme to a government salary 
or pension for women – a significant fact given the high value and status attached to 
government salaries. Women also expressed the view that the money belonged to them and 
not to the men of their households. 
Many of the rural residents and some urban informants, who had been displaced due the 
floods, had also been recipients of the one-off flood compensation transfer known as the 
Watan Card. The value of this transfer varied but it ranged from Rs.20,000 to 80,000 
(approximately US$225 to US$950). This was generally controlled by men who made bulky 
purchases including durable consumer items using the cash. Early instalments were used by 
some households to replenish their grain stocks which had been washed away in the floods. 
6 Prices, inflation, economic changes and 
responses 
Changes in food prices at the national and local levels have been discussed in Sections 2 
and 3 respectively. In the previous section (Section 4) we described the nature of the food 
economy in the rural and urban fieldwork sites, and the interaction of the poor in both sites 
with markets and prices. This sets the context for an understanding of the impact of changes 
in food prices for various segments of the poor. We found that the rural site was 
characterised by the circulation of food – particularly the staple – through transactions which 
were mostly not denominated in prices. The same was true for some of the poorest in the 
urban site that relied on charity, alms and begging. Moreover, as we have noted in Section 2, 
while food price inflation has been high in the time period of our fieldwork, the type of 
volatility which marked the 2007-2009 period is absent and food price inflation has been in 
line with or lower than overall rates of inflation. It is in this overall context that we move on, in 
this section, to describing and analysing fieldwork findings with respect to local perceptions 
of inflation and its causes, changes in the food economy of case study households during the 
study period (particularly from Year 1 to Year 2), and coping behaviour. 
6.1 Local perceptions of prices and inflation 
A methodology such as the one used in this study is valuable for understanding processes, 
norms and relational issues. We rely on individual recollection of events (prices and changes 
in prices) and responses (changes in consumption). It is important to take into consideration, 
therefore, factors which might influence individual perceptions of economic variables.26 
Individual perceptions about prices and inflation are shaped at least in part by exposure to 
the media and peer group discussion. While some individuals keep an active account of 
prices of various commodities, and their own consumption behaviour at different moments in 
time (including, in response to price changes), many others only have a general sense of 
both prices and their own consumption responses. There is also much processing of these 
experiences, in terms of recall, through discussion among peer groups. Exposure to the 
media implies that news as well as analysis about prices and inflation, their causes and their 
impact can influence how individuals and their peer groups make sense of economic 
information.  
We have shown in Section 4 that while market transactions are the norm even in rural areas, 
there are important parts of the food economy of the poor that are based on circulation which 
                                               
26  An alternate method, commonly used, is the use of larger sample surveys to solicit information about the level of 
consumption and expenditure on various commodities, and then to measure responses to price changes by comparing 
consumption levels at different prices (usually over time). 
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is often not denominated in prices. Among rural informants, total reliance on the purchasing 
of the main staple food was a rarity. Households maintained their own stocks of grain from 
their farm produce or harvest labour, and relied on borrowing of grain to meet the shortfall. In 
the urban site, by contrast, there was almost complete reliance on price-based transactions, 
with the exception of those who managed to subsist on alms and begging. Among non-staple 
food items, some such as potatoes, cooking fat, sugar and tea are almost universally 
purchased from local retailers, as are other higher value food items such as fresh 
vegetables, legumes, meat, and fresh fruit. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, rural perceptions about food price inflation and its impact are 
mostly with respect to those who earn salaries and are hence active purchasers from 
retailers. The rise in prices is compared immediately, in the rural site, with the ability of 
salaried employees to keep up. It is generally believed that while food prices have risen in 
the last two years, government salaries have more than kept up with the change, as have 
casual wages rates. 
In urban areas the discussion about prices and inflation was more nuanced. Here too, it was 
believed that salaries of government employees had more than kept up with inflation. It was 
also acknowledged that wages of other workers have also risen. But several informants, 
including one whose husband was a salaried employee, used the term ‘barkat’ translated 
roughly as goodness or blessing, when referring to wage and salary increases. They said 
there was no barkat in increases in incomes, as prices rose faster. These perceptions about 
prices, however, were almost always expressed in very general terms, and not with 
reference to the price of any particular food item. The exception was milk, about which there 
was a general perception in 2012 that the price had risen very rapidly, with complaints of 
unaffordability. This was, indeed, a period when milk prices had risen sharply.  
Reasons for prices and inflation were also expressed in somewhat general terms – and there 
is cause to suspect that the analysis for economic trends offered in the media was widely 
accepted and reiterated. Macroeconomic events such as rising world oil prices as well as 
national economic policies such as taxation were considered by a number of informants as 
being responsible for price rises. In fact, petroleum prices fluctuated in this period but were 
not on a consistent upwards trend. There were also no significant changes in tax policies, 
even though some were discussed in the media from time to time. Some informants held the 
view that prices increased due to the knock-on effect of prices of inputs, and copycat 
behaviour on the part of traders. This comes close to the understanding of general inflation in 
Pakistan being, at least in part, a monetary phenomenon, with governments resorting to 
borrowing due to their inability to balance budgets.27 Interestingly, rural informants who did 
express opinions about price rises did try to link these to supply issues – such as the rise in 
agricultural input prices or the loss of crops due to floods. 
The regulatory aspect of government was also thought to be responsible for high prices and 
inflation. While some informants said that the government wilfully fails to regulate traders and 
retailers (and profiteering), others felt that the problem lay elsewhere. Traders and retailers 
were just too powerful and the government too weak. Some urban informants felt that 
criminal mafias extorted money from shopkeepers, traders and factory owners who then 
passed on this cost to the consumer. Political motivation was also held responsible for 
inflation quite widely. In 2012 many of the informants had said that the incumbent 
government did not care for the poor and inflicted hardship upon them. Following elections 
and the change of government in May 2013 virtually the same accusations were levelled 
against the current incumbent, to the extent that some informants now praised the previous 
government for having looked after the poor. These sweeping populist statements are almost 
                                               
27  Paradoxically, inflation in this situation is not so much due to rising taxation, but due to the inability of the government to 
raise tax-GDP ratios to those required for balanced budgets over the long term. 
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certainly traceable to opinions expressed in popularly watched and combative television chat 
shows in Pakistan. 
We have already discussed coping mechanisms in the face of adverse economic shock in 
Section 4 (with respect to formal and informal social protection and support). It was more 
difficult to elicit engaged responses to questions about food price volatility. This was due to at 
least three reasons. First, as shown above, many of the poor do not rely on price-
denominated transactions for the acquisition of the main staple. Second, food price inflation 
and volatility has not been particularly high in Pakistan in recent years. Third, and relatedly, 
given that food price inflation and volatility have not been historically high in recent years it is 
difficult for the poor to separate out the effects of prices from other adverse (or positive) 
shocks which they faced. While acknowledging the importance of prices, Mrs B, an urban 
informant told us: ‘I have enough troubles of my own to bother about this inflation’. Those 
who did offer views on responses to price shocks said that some people had changed their 
professions and occupations to keep up with changes in wages in prices. They also said that 
households reduced non-food expenditures such as those on schooling, clothing, travel and 
social visits in response to high food prices. In our actual case studies, however, we were not 
able to find specific examples illustrating and elaborating these responses. We believe that 
these responses come from a generic stock of answers emerging from peer group 
discussion rather than directly identifiable experience. The remainder of this section 
presents, therefore, a description and analysis of economic shocks faced by the poor using 
our case studies. 
6.2 Cases of conspicuous change 
Out of the twenty case studies (ten each in the rural and the urban site) we identified nine 
(five in the urban site and four in the rural) who had faced conspicuous economic changes in 
the period between the first survey and the revisit. The nature of the economic change was 
substantive and idiosyncratic in each case – related to life cycle events, ill-health, accidents, 
family breakup, and eviction – and dominated the impact of general economic conditions or 
even local economic circumstances. The fact that so many of our sample households had 
such conspicuous economic changes does not mean, of course, that we can make any 
general statement about the prevalence of idiosyncratic shock in the population. Our work is 
of a qualitative nature and the sample does not represent the population in the statistical 
sense. Given the focus of this study on poor, food insecure and vulnerable households, the 
relatively high prevalence of households with conspicuous shocks is understandable. 
Cases 
There was one case of a rural household (that of Mrs Q) that underwent a significant 
improvement in its economic position and food consumption between the first survey and 
revisit due to the acquisition of a government job. The household was very poor and had 
lived on the premises of the local school for several years after their house was washed 
away in rains. At the time of the first survey Mrs Q’s husband worked at a bus terminal in 
Hyderabad (a major city located over 3 hours from the village by road), and Mrs Q would buy 
rations when he was able to send cash. At the time of the revisit Mrs Q’s husband had been 
recruited in the police and was on training prior to deployment. Although his initial salary was 
mostly spent on boarding expenses during the training period, the household had started to 
obtain items on credit from retailers who felt assured that they would be repaid. They were 
already eating better as a result. According to Mrs Q their social standing in the community 
had risen – in the previous year she had said other villagers looked down upon them 
because they did not have their own home and were squatting in the school. In the second 
year she reported that those who previously shunned her were eager to resume social ties 
with her. 
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In three of the rural cases livelihoods were under stress due to local political factors which 
combined with ill-health and life-cycle events to cause significant economic downturn 
between the first interview and the resurvey. A Manganhar (drum-beaters) household has 
progressively lost its clientele due to recent religious injunctions by local clerics against 
celebratory music. The main earner was an elderly man who was unable to do other forms of 
work. The households of Mrs P and Mrs U had both suffered decline over the years due to 
conflicts with dominant landlords, in which household members had been implicated in costly 
court cases. Mrs P’s household had seen a major decline in fortunes as the landlords had 
been able to attach her brother’s pension from his government salaried job in a case where 
damages were awarded against him. Mrs P’s mother had been injured in a road accident, in 
the meanwhile, and the household had to raise cash for her treatment. Mrs U’s household 
had been involved in a dispute with the landlords over post-harvest grain division some years 
ago and had lost land they had cultivated as tenants. Her husband had then resorted to 
various types of labour including chopping trees for wood. Recently, he had injured his eye 
and was no longer able to work as a woodcutter. While the Manganhars had been reduced to 
begging for alms from their neighbours, Mrs P and Mrs U borrowed grain at a high premium 
from local retailers. 
In the urban site we had two poor and food-insecure flood-displaced cases for whom 
conspicuous changes occurred between the first survey and the revisit. Mrs J’s household 
was struggling to make ends meet in 2012. She had had a relatively better life in the village 
before the flood but had arrived in Karachi in penury after her household lost its home and 
assets. In 2012 we found her reliant on a number of families for food. Such was the 
dependence that she reported that she only cooked food herself when her neighbours 
happened to be away. Her husband did not work, and her son had been recently dismissed 
from his job at a CNG station. She had said then that her landlord, who was also her uncle, 
was not happy with her household, and they had not been able to keep up with rent 
payments. She feared that she might be evicted. In the following year we found that she had, 
indeed, moved because her landlord had evicted her. The household could not find a 
suitable place to live in the same neighbourhood and had moved far away through the help 
of a friend of her husband who was from the same tribe but not a close kin. Mrs J’s family 
had an on-going dispute with their immediate relatives and this was one factor in their 
relative marginality. In the new place they no longer had access to alms since the neighbours 
did not know them. They subsisted by peeling garlics at home. 
In 2012 we had met Mr O, a flood-displaced young man who had no home but slept in a 
shop. The shopkeeper and others helped him with food, and he worked as a labourer, 
sending most of his wages to maintain his family in the village. Mr O’s own marriage had 
broken down because his father-in-law said that he was not sending his daughter to live in 
poverty. In 2013 we found that Mr O had sent for his family from the village and they now 
lived in a rented home in the urban site. He no longer had to send money home, and his 
brothers who had joined him now earned in the city. They remained very poor but now he ate 
at home. The breakdown of his marriage had been formalised in the meanwhile, and he was 
now divorced. 
When we met Mrs T, a migrant from Rahimyar Khan, in 2012 she was already having 
difficulty making ends meet. She told us that her husband who had used up their savings and 
taken loans to set up a barber shop in a nearby locality had to abandon that business 
because of constant extortion demands from local thugs. Customers would often refuse to 
pay and bullied him when he demanded payment. He had started driving a rickshaw on hire. 
In 2013 he had given up on the rickshaw too due to frequent CNG closures and hence 
difficulties in meeting the rental charge for the rickshaw. He had become violent and beat 
Mrs T if she asked for money for rations. Her poverty had increased, and if food was short 
the children were sent to her mother’s home while she herself was fed by the neighbours 
who knew about her situation. 
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Mrs B who had seen somewhat better times was relatively better off than Mrs T, but had 
suffered a breakdown of her family between the first survey and the revisit. In 2012 she had 
reported that her husband worked as a driver, lived at home and contributed to household 
expenses. The husband’s mother and then his sister had been abandoned by their 
respective husbands and had moved in with them. By 2013 Mrs B discovered that her 
husband had been seeing another woman whom he then married and moved in with. Her 
husband’s brothers who used to formerly contribute to household expenses now did so only 
sporadically. Mrs B said her husband’s mother and sister had started to harass her over 
domestic matters, and she feared that they might be trying to get her to leave.  
Mrs S was one our poorest informants in the urban site when we met her in 2012. Her idea of 
‘good food’ then was cabbage and chicken offal, and she bought small portions of cooked 
food because it was more expensive for her to cook such tiny amounts. Her husband had 
died and her sons worked as casual labourers. She said she was insecure about her home: 
‘if we cannot pay the rent we will live a tent’. In 2013 her situation had deteriorated further, 
and she said they ate worse. Her eldest son who was the main earner had been involved in 
an accident at his worksite and was unable to work for some time. 
Discussion 
These cases highlight a range of inter-connected factors which led to significant change in 
the economic and food security situation of our informants. General economic conditions, 
inflation rates and food prices were not conspicuous factors in these changes at least from 
the subjective point of view of these individual and households. Life-cycle events such as old 
age, ill-health, and accidents all contributed to the worsening of the situation of rural as well 
as urban households. Local political factors, such as conflicts with dominant landlords, or 
extortion demands from local thugs, were some discrete events, at least in these cases, but 
were manifestations of longer processes of social marginality. The breakdown of family ties 
manifested itself through higher incidence of domestic violence in one case, dissolution of 
marriages, and disputes with close relatives were at times caused by economic shock, and in 
turn exacerbated the impact of shock. Social status was gained through access to a salaried 
job in one case, and in another case steady income from government was lost as a result of 
a conflict with local power-brokers. Migration was both a response to extreme hardship, led 
to the perpetuation of bare survival, but also at times led to the consolidation of a household 
and some economic improvement. 
7 Future farmers 
7.1 Background 
This section covers the ‘special topic’ for Year 1 which answers the broad question: ‘what are 
the prospects for young people, and how does agriculture feature among their livelihood 
options?’ This reasoning stems from the following question: given high prices of food over 
the last few years, is it possible that agriculture could become a favourable livelihood option 
for young people, especially those residing in rural areas? To explore this topic we asked our 
respondents, in the rural as well as the urban site, about livelihood prospects of young 
people, the aspirations young people hold and what their parents want for their future, 
whether agriculture is viewed as a reliable and attractive livelihood option and if preferences 
with regards to occupation have changed in the recent past. In the urban areas, the research 
questions also try to probe whether agriculture is seen more favourably in light of food price 
volatility as it ensures a supply of food even in times of food price crisis and shortages.  
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7.2 How is agriculture viewed as a livelihood option?  
While the economy in the rural site does benefit from high prices of agricultural produce as it 
increases investment by large landowners such as the Raaes, the extent to which high food 
prices have translated directly to increased income for poorest households involved in 
agriculture in the rural site is not clear. Most agricultural households are either tenant farmers 
or agricultural labourers and they earn in kind (wheat) rather than cash (for more details on 
grain acquisition and livelihoods refer to Section 5). A common belief present in our rural site 
was that when prices of agricultural products increase, individuals further down the supply-
chain such as the middle-men and traders benefit rather than the growers. In the period of 
high food prices, there have also been increases in the price of agricultural inputs such as 
fertiliser and pesticide, and since most farming contracts are on the basis of sharecropping 
whereby the landowner deducts cost of inputs from final product, the returns from farming 
have not necessarily increased even if the selling price of crop has risen. For agriculture to 
be a more favourable option, the returns from agricultural employment have to be greater 
than returns from other occupations.  
Agriculture is not seen as a reliable source of livelihood especially in the rural site – only one 
crop is grown annually and there is deficiency of water. Farmers are thus unemployed for 
half the year and have to supplement their income by taking up employment as daily wage 
labourers either in/around the village or in another city. Moreover, farmers are paid in kind 
and even though farming guarantees a stock of grain and hence food security, as the 
economy transitions more towards a cash economy, grain is not adequate since some 
services (e.g. health) require a household to have cash.  
Agriculture is also thought to be dependent upon exogenous shocks such as weather or 
natural disasters especially following the floods and heavy rains in 2010 and 2011 and as 
prices of crops fluctuate income from agriculture is not stable. With increased mechanisation, 
returns to labour in agriculture have fallen, and there was a general feeling in the rural site 
that income earned from agriculture had fallen especially for agriculture labourers. Even for 
those who have small landholdings, agriculture is increasingly seen as unfavourable as there 
has been a decrease in the amount of land owned over generations and as family sizes grow 
there is less land left for an individual to farm on leading to underemployment.  
Others jobs are preferred 
I prefer a government job over (owning and working on) land because it is difficult to 
cultivate land as one has to sow the seeds, water it, harvest it and eventually there is 
not much benefit. 
(Mrs F, whose sons are rickshaw drivers in Dadu) 
 
As Mrs F points out, returns to farming are perceived to be low and farming is considered to 
have no ‘benefit’. Agricultural work is considered to be tough and time-consuming as multiple 
stages of work are required. Agriculture also involves being tied to a landowner. Instead, 
there is a preference for government jobs in Dadu and similarly for salaried jobs in Karachi 
and they are viewed as a route to a better future. Such jobs guarantee a salary at the end of 
the month unlike farming which is seasonal and earning is vulnerable to shocks. When asked 
about aspirations for their children, a common response from our informants was a job for 
their sons so that ‘they are free from cultivating land’. Parents wanted their children to get 
educated and become ‘officers’. In the urban area too farming is considered a profession that 
‘ruins lives’ and is associated with restricted mobility. As put by one respondent: ‘if they [our 
children] pursue agriculture they will remain uneducated and ignorant’. Even if land 
cultivation offers money, it is viewed as the least preferable option as it restricts 
development. An inverse relationship thus exists between education and farming. Education 
is also seen as a way out of agriculture as it increases the likelihood of receiving a job. 
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However, the poor felt that this was not an option for them as they are unable to afford to 
send their children to school and for many the reality is that a farmer’s son remains a farmer.  
In the urban area, a common feeling was that life in Karachi is better than life in a village 
especially among respondents who had migrated from a rural area in the last few years. 
While life as a farmer guarantees grain and hence food security whereas in an urban area 
there is a greater risk of going hungry, farming and rural life is considered restrictive. Some 
felt that life in a city was less risky in terms of going hungry because many different work 
options were present whereas in a village economy there is greater dependency on 
agriculture and more exposure to covariate risks i.e. if a crop fails one season, then everyone 
goes hungry. Urban labourers were also thought to be better off than farmers because 
‘whether it is hot or cold the farmer has to complete his work’.  
For agricultural employment to become preferable there has to be an increase in returns 
relative to other occupations. As mentioned earlier, increase in price of agricultural outputs 
leads to more investment in the rural economy but the impact is not limited to agriculture 
alone and extends to off-farm job creation as well. For example, in the rural site, the Raees 
was constructing a house which had increased jobs for daily wage labourers. Moreover, 
there are other sources of positive shock besides output price increases which affect the 
rural economy. In the case of our fieldwork site, the election of the Raaes as a legislator had 
improved the chances of gaining government employment which had improved the 
livelihoods of many households and had also incentivised investment in the education of 
children so they could move out of farming and obtain government jobs.  
7.3 What is the future for young people in these communities? 
For the young people interviewed in our study, a ‘good life’ means a comfortable house and 
a good education which in turn helps achieve a better life. They want a job which can earn 
them respect and progress in life. For some, having money is the most important as with 
money you can get a good education, a good job and respect. Across the sites, a common 
response received was that young people want to move away from traditional occupations 
and be in a profession different from their parents. As discussed earlier, the young do not 
aspire to be farmers as they feel agriculture to be an occupation associated with lack of 
education and one without a future.  
However, young people have to face many barriers in realising their future aspirations. In the 
rural site, government schools are non-functioning and private education is expensive and so 
the poor cannot afford to send their children to school. In Karachi, while there are more 
households which have children going to school, the poorest are left out due to 
unaffordability or because the young have to take up employment to contribute to household 
incomes. Apart from education, it is felt that there is a lack of skills and training which makes 
finding stable employment difficult. In the rural site, government jobs are usually available 
only to those who have access to the Raees whereas in the urban site a government job is 
obtainable only if officials receive a bribe. Among the male youth in Karachi, hostility towards 
other ethnic groups is seen as they feel they are discriminated on the basis of their ethnicity 
which curtails them from getting a good job or even better grades in board examinations.  
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8 Local accountability for hunger 
8.1 Background 
The ‘special topic’ for Year 2 was ‘Food Rights and Accountability for Hunger’. The objective 
of this research is to contribute to the debate on right to food and accountability by asking the 
following questions at the community level (King et al. 2014):  
 
• How accountable does the food system look from the bottom-up – from the perspective 
of people who spend more on food than on anything else, whom food price rises are 
most likely to hurt?  
• Do people feel they have a right to food? If so, what does that mean?  
• Who is responsible for ensuring that right is made real? How are they held to account?  
 
For more details about the concept and approach towards this topic refer to King et al., 2014.  
While there is debate about social protection and nutrition in the public discourse in Pakistan, 
there is an absence of discussion on ‘Right to Food’. At the moment, ‘right to food’ is limited 
to a statement in the constitution which says that the ‘State shall provide basic necessities of 
life such as food [..] for all such citizens, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, as are 
permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness or 
unemployment’ (National Assembly of Pakistan 2012). As discussed in Section 2, a Ministry 
for National Food Security and Research has been created in the federal government which 
is responsible for coordinating and providing oversight to food security policies and 
programmes across different sectors and levels of the government. The food security policy, 
which has still not been approved, emphasises more on agriculture and supply issues and 
less on improving food accessibility. The government collects price data on a regular basis 
and keeps an eye on price changes in order to take the necessary action. However, the 
focus of the government’s price regulation system (done through local administration as 
discussed in Section 2) is not food security but to make sure there are not any shortages of 
essential food items and retailers are not making excessive profits. 
 
While in our research sites there was no explicit mention or awareness of the price control 
system, respondents did feel that food price inflation takes place because retailers and 
traders charge high rates to make large profits at the expense of the consumers. The 
government is not held responsible for lack of price regulation. For instance when Mrs T, an 
urban informant was asked about the reason behind high prices, she said: ‘The large 
shopkeepers are the reason behind high prices not Zardari [the former President] [he] has 
nothing to do with it’. When respondents were asked how inflation can be controlled, many 
suggested a force which can control shopkeepers without there being an acknowledgement 
of the fact that such a mechanism already exists.  
8.2 What does the right to food mean in our research sites? 
There is consensus among respondents that everyone has a right to food regardless of age, 
gender and social status. Why a right to food exists, however, depends on the individual 
being referred to i.e. a man, woman or child. It was commonly understood that men have a 
right to food because they go out to earn and provide for their families, women have a right to 
as they take care of the household and children and if they do not get sufficient food an 
impact will be felt on others she is responsible for, and children have a right to food because 
they are young/innocent and cannot fend for themselves. However, the ‘right to food’ was not 
understood by our respondents as a specific legal entitlement individuals have as citizens of 
a country, but was interpreted as a more general concept.  
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When asked who has the responsibility of ensuring individuals are not hungry, God, 
household, community and the government were identified. For some Allah is responsible for 
ensuring there is enough food for individuals but many were not completely fatalistic and said 
that even though God is responsible for the provision of food, individuals cannot completely 
rely on his mercy and need to make an effort to ensure they (and those they are responsible 
for) are fed. At the household level, there is a gendered division of roles whereby the 
husband or other male members have the responsibility to provide for women and children 
and in return women carry out care duties and look after their husband and their children. As 
Mrs Z, an informant in the rural site put it: ‘whether one begs or earns, it is the responsibility 
of the head of the household to feed his family’. 
There were not many responses which held the community or neighbours responsible for 
ensuring that no one in their neighbourhood was going hungry, since everyone is poor and 
cannot be expected to provide for others outside of their own household. Some responsibility 
was attributed to the government and/or to the representatives of the government such as 
the Raees/legislator in the case of Dadu. As one of our rural respondents put it, the Raees is 
not responsible for providing for people because of his own will but because he gets paid by 
the government. There was a sense among respondents that since the government was 
voted into power by them, it had the responsibility of ensuring there is adequate food 
available for them.  
8.3 Accountability for hunger  
Even though there was an understanding that the state should be responsible for providing 
food to everyone, there was lack of clarity with regards to how it can be held accountable. 
Only one informant alluded to the local government machinery (the district government) as 
being responsible for ensuring there are no food shortages and hunger. The media was often 
cited as a tool through which the government can be made aware of their responsibilities. 
This is not surprising as the media has in the last few years developed an agenda of 
highlighting the elected government’s failure. A few respondents thought protest was the best 
way of getting the government’s attention to force it to address the problems of the people. 
Some believed that there should be an authority established to check prices so that 
shopkeepers and traders are not able to earn high profits at the expense of consumers. 
There was also a feeling that the government’s responsibility should be limited to creating an 
environment where jobs are available and there is employment for all, so that individuals are 
able to provide for themselves. However, a sense of helplessness was prevalent among 
respondents as they felt that because of their poverty they lacked the power to be able to 
voice their opinions. According to one of our household interview respondents in Karachi it is 
better to stay quiet and at home and work hard to earn income rather than try to hold 
someone accountable for hunger. There was also some resentment towards government 
officials, especially in Karachi, as they were viewed as corrupt and only interested in 
providing for themselves rather than the poor.  
Our respondents were not able to identify any systems that exist which ensure a right to food 
and those that can be held accountable for hunger. When asked about NGOs or charity 
organisations, a common response in Dadu - where there was great NGOs activity following 
the floods - was that while NGOs help during emergency situations they could not be 
expected to be present at all times and certainly not be held accountable for hunger. In 
Karachi, where many charity organisations are active in providing food for the poor, in our 
site such charities were not operational.  
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9 Conclusions and recommendations 
In this section we offer concluding observations based on our reading of the secondary data 
and the policy environment (Section 2), and our analysis of the purposive qualitative survey 
of poor and vulnerable individuals and households in 2012 and 2013 (Sections 3-7). We then 
address three areas of recommendations emerging from this report. 
9.1 Concluding observations 
The main purpose of this study was to examine the impact of food price volatility which 
emerged as a major concern in the global economy on food insecurity faced by poor and 
vulnerable individuals and households. The primary source of insight here is voices at two 
‘listening posts’, one each in a rural and urban area of Pakistan. Besides food price inflation 
and volatility, this study also obtained detailed information on social networks, coping 
mechanisms, the functioning of local markets, food access and acquisition arrangements, 
sources of shock, as well as on two special topics: future farmers and local accountability to 
food insecurity. 
Pakistan was, indeed, one of the countries adversely affected by the food and fuel price 
crises that hit the global economy in 2008-2009. Partly as a result of those crises the 
country’s economy went into a downturn. Because the food price crisis affected Pakistan 
through shortages and local price spirals in the main staple food (wheat flour) the policy 
response too was focused on preventing future shortages and price spirals. Our review of the 
secondary evidence on food price inflation and volatility concurs with the findings of 
international organisations and the FPV global report that while high food prices remained an 
issue of policy watchfulness in Pakistan in 2012 and 2013, food price inflation was below 
general inflation, and suffered from relatively little volatility. Pakistan, therefore, might be 
regarded as one of the countries where price volatility had been brought under control. 
These findings from secondary data were confirmed at our listening posts. While there were 
complaints about economic hardship and general inflation, there were few voices raised 
about prices of specific food items. 
This does not mean, of course, that food insecurity was not a concern in Pakistan. Rather, it 
might have been the case that volatility was dampened through higher price levels, 
particularly for urban consumers. Our qualitative research elaborates on the findings of 
representative sample surveys which show that large segments of the population consume 
far fewer calories than the required norm. We found that poor and vulnerable individuals and 
households experience hunger at least on some days in a year. Moreover, many of the social 
and economic arrangements which operate in rural and urban communities can be seen as 
informal systems for mitigating the risk of hunger. These systems succeed for the most part 
in preventing prolonged periods of hunger for individuals and households, but do not always 
prevent shorter periods of hunger. Hunger and food insecurity, in any case, are seen by the 
poor in terms of not having enough bread to eat. It does not extend to the absence of dietary 
diversity or the inability to eat nutritious foods. Eating bread with very simple and non-
nutritious accompaniments is a norm that applies to a wide segment of the population some 
or most of the time. 
Salient economic and social arrangements which help to mitigate the risk of outright hunger 
for prolonged periods are what we have discussed using the terms ‘food economy’ and 
‘informal social support’. These arrangements also reduce the dependence of many of the 
poorest on price denominated transactions, and work alongside government policies for 
controlling food price volatility to ensure that food price volatility does not emerge as a 
conspicuous political issue. By ‘food economy’ we refer to the primacy of food access and 
acquisition in the livelihood strategies of the poor. In agricultural rural areas food economy 
arrangements include self-production, in-kind wages, non-price denominated exchange, and 
 49 
 
general circulation of food items in reciprocity, vertical patronage and begging, as well as 
food markets. In urban areas too, where there is much greater reliance on markets, there are 
significant numbers of people who routinely or often rely on the non-price denominated 
circulation of food items. We found that there was an overlap between gift exchange of food 
between peers and assistance to those who may face temporary shortages. Similarly, there 
was some overlap between assistance, charity and alms. Poor and vulnerable households 
moved back and forth from self-sufficiency to being recipients of assistance (usually from 
their peer group) and charity (from patrons), to outright begging for alms, depending on their 
particular circumstances. Informal social assistance, moreover, was not without a social cost 
in terms of the loss of respect and honour, and the weakening of peer group ties. Various 
degrees of dependence could be found in the fieldwork sites. 
Idiosyncratic shocks were commonplace among our study cases and although this did not 
signify the prevalence of risks in the population as a whole, our cases did provide an 
indication of sources of economic shocks and their correlates. Life-cycle events, ill-health, 
accidents, conflict and incidents of violence, disputes with kinfolk and peers, and family 
breakdown were some important sources of economic shock. These shocks may have 
exacerbated economic hardship linked to macroeconomic conditions (such as growth, 
employment, inflation and price volatility) but dominated the perceptions of economic shock 
in the subjective view of the individuals concerned. The high prevalence and severity of 
these idiosyncratic shocks in the lives of the poor in rural and urban areas further reduced 
the visibility, therefore, of food price volatility as an urgent policy or political issue. 
Formal economic and social systems in the form of salaried jobs on the one hand, and state 
cash transfer programmes on the other, were present and acknowledged as significant 
sources of support in different ways. A government salaried job is highly valued by the food 
insecure in both rural and urban areas as a stable and predictable source of food security. 
For the poor, obtaining a government job, although difficult, was still considered a promising 
way out of food insecurity and vulnerability to hunger. While the state cash transfer 
programme was relatively small in terms of the value of the transfer (compared with salaried 
employment), in some ways it was regarded as a comparable source of support. 
Beneficiaries compared the cash transfer (particularly the BISP transfer to women) 
favourably to loans which had to be repaid. Interestingly, they did not compare it to charity 
from the better-off, and saw no negative connotations in terms of loss of respect or social 
status as a result of becoming programme beneficiaries. Some likened the BISP to 
government salaries or pensions, but for women. 
The young in rural and urban areas look to non-farm employment, particularly a salaried 
government job, as a promising career. Higher prices for farm produce do not appear to have 
changed this outlook. Farm work was seen as being associated with a lack of education and 
social backwardness – something that aspiring young people in urban as well as rural areas 
sought to escape. While there was evidence of increasing agricultural output as well as 
benefits of this growth to the rural economy in general, this did not translate into enthusiasm 
for agricultural work as a career choice. 
Besides the cash transfer, government policies with respect to food security have been 
focused on maintaining price stability and preventing the formation of price spirals and 
hoarding. This is the case at the national level with wheat procurement policies, as well as 
the monitoring of prices of basic commodities and interventions in markets through regulated 
openings to international trade. At the local level government has a system in place for 
monitoring and checking prices with the objective of preventing profiteering and hoarding on 
the part of dealers and retailers. These systems, even the local ones, however, are neither 
aimed at ensuring food security nor perceived by the community as being effective. 
Regulated prices, in any case, reflect market prices and are set in consultation with market 
and traders’ associations. The government is therefore cited only vaguely as a guarantor of 
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food security by poor people at our listening posts, unless it is mentioned as a possible 
source of a salaried job. Their ideas about where responsibility for ensuring access to food 
lies range from the divine (God) to male family members or earning heads of households. 
9.2 Recommendations 
What we need to keep monitoring 
• While food price volatility has not been a serious issue in Pakistan since the crisis of 
2008-2009, that crisis had a lasting impact on the economy. The policy response to the 
crisis was based on the understanding that Pakistan cannot isolate its economy from 
global prices through trade restrictions alone, and that wheat procurement prices need to 
be able to anticipate world prices in order to ensure the prevention of local hoarding, 
collusion, shortage and price spirals. While the policy has been successful, there is still a 
need to continue monitoring for any lapses in the policy at the national/provincial level, 
and local price spirals and shortages from the community-level listening posts. 
• The cash transfer programme which was the other key policy response to the 2008-2009 
crisis, developed into the main social protection programme. This programme, as we 
have shown, provides some level of food security to the poor, particularly women, but is 
limited in its coverage. The continuation of the programme, moreover, depends on 
political support in government, parliament, the general public and the donor community. 
At the policy level, therefore, there is a need to monitor the progress of the cash transfer 
programme – both its continuation, but also improvements in its scope and coverage. 
The community-level listening posts provide an additional source of information about 
the functioning of the programme. 
• As the government is moving towards a food security policy, there is a need to monitor 
the progress of policy development, and particularly the specific mandates which are 
envisaged at various levels of government to ensure food security. Once the policy is 
established, it is necessary to monitor its impact at the community level (if there are, 
indeed, new initiatives for food security and accountability at the local level) from our 
listening posts. 
 
What needs immediate action, where and by whom? 
• Given that Pakistan’s social protection paradigm is now based on a targeted cash 
transfer programme, this is the main formal instrument for preventing hunger and food 
insecurity. While the targeting of the programme has been widely acknowledged as 
being a major improvement over prior targeting mechanisms, as our qualitative study 
has shown there are still many vulnerable individuals and households that have been left 
out. These individuals and households continue to be vulnerable to short bouts of 
hunger – even if they are generally able to access and acquire sufficient quantities of the 
main staple. There is a need, therefore, for ensuring that the programme is able to reach 
out to these vulnerable individuals and households. At the national level this requires 
lobbying and advocacy, as well as the preparation and presentation of unbiased 
evidence for expanding outreach, and for designing complementary targeting methods to 
ensure the inclusion of more of the vulnerable. At the local level there is scope for 
community-based mobilisation by civil society organisations for expanding coverage and 
improving outreach. 
 
What do we need to understand better or on a larger scale? 
• In the rural context we need a better understanding of the food economy and how it 
functions. The insights gained from qualitative research need to be backed up by 
comprehensive investigations in more locations to build up knowledge of how the food 
economy actually functions in various areas, how it influences other social and economic 
arrangements, who is protected and when, and who is vulnerable and how. We need 
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research to establish more authoritatively whether and to what extent the finding of this 
study – that there is value in giving primacy to the food economy in interpreting 
economic and social institutions and the behaviour of individuals – is true, and what are 
its implications for food security policy. 
• Also in the rural context we need a better understanding in the medium term of the 
impact of on-going agricultural mechanisation on the food economy, and particularly on 
the demand for harvest labour. Since harvest labour is a key element in the food 
economy of the landless, who constitute at least half the rural households – this aspect 
of technological change needs to be better understood in order to formulate policy and 
advocacy proposals. 
• In the urban context our study has made observations about the existing price regulation 
system which is focused on the prevention of profiteering and hoarding, but is seen as 
largely ineffectual. It will be important to understand in greater detail how this system 
works, and whether and to what extent, in the context of a market economy, the system 
might itself be a source of friction, uncompetitive practices and collusion. 
• Another key issue which has emerged from our study is the unpredictability of other 
markets which matter to the poor. The labour market is a source of uncertainty and risk 
in any case, and combined with conflict, extortion, strikes and other aspects of urban 
governance in Karachi can be a major source of income and consumption shock and 
food insecurity. The housing market (particularly for rented accommodation) is another 
source of vulnerability and unpredictability for the poor in urban areas. While the main 
concern of this study has been with unpredictability in food markets and the impact of 
that unpredictability on food insecurity, it is important also to understand better the food 
security implications of unpredictability in these other markets. 
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Glossary 
 
Barkat blessing  
Beeh locally grown lotus roots 
Ghee hydrogenated vegetable fat 
Kumhar potter 
Lassi a yoghurt-based drink 
Mandi literally market, refers to a wholesale market where auctions are carried out 
Maund a local unit of measurement equal to forty kilograms 
Mohalla neighbourhood 
Paratha  wheat flour flat bread fried in oil 
Pakora  deep-fried gram flour fritters 
Rabi  winter crop grown between October and April 
Raees  chieftain of a tribe  
Ramzan  Muslim month of fasting 
Sasti Roti cheap bread 
Roti  flat bread made out of wheat flour 
Tandoor oven 
Saag  edible leafy part of a mustard plant 
Watan card cash transfer scheme of the Government of Pakistan for those affected by 
the Indus floods of 2010 
